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I. Introduction
We live in a divided society, from gated communities to cell
blocks congested with disproportionate numbers of young
African-American men.1 There are rich and poor, privileged and
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Of Counsel, Berens & Miller,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. See F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN
POST-RACIAL AMERICA 14, 18, 29, 39, 157–58, 161–62, 212 (2013) (noting that the
victimization and unequal treatment of blacks persists in present-day society).
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homeless, Democrats and Republicans, wealthy zip codes and
stubbornly impoverished ones. There are committed ―Black Lives
Matter‖ protestors, and there are those who—invoking ―Blue
Lives Matter‖—demonstrate in support of America‘s hardworking police officers.2 In her new article, ―Matters of Strata:
Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases,‖ George
Washington University law professor Phyllis Goldfarb highlights
the stratification of our society and offers a compelling critique of
America‘s death penalty regime—one, she notes, that is ―deeply
affected by structures of race, gender, and class.‖3 With the
number of death sentences and executions declining,4 Professor
Goldfarb‘s article exposes the grim realities—miscarriages of
justice, runaway arbitrariness, and persistent discrimination—
that may ultimately lead to a judicial declaration that America‘s
2. See 31 EX AUDITU: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE THEOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE ix (2015) (the journal‘s ―Race and Racism‖ issue).
The recent U.S. presidential election—one in which Donald Trump won the
Electoral College vote but in which Hillary Clinton won the popular vote—
illustrates the current ideological divisions in American life. Zachary Roth,
Electoral College Lesson: More Voters Chose Clinton, But Trump Will Be
President, NBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016election-day/electoral-college-lesson-more-voters-chose-hillary-clinton-trumpwill-n681701 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also Byron Tau, With Clinton Far Ahead in Popular Vote, Hill
Democrats Explore Electoral College Overhaul, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/12/06/with-clinton-far-ahead-in-popularvote-hill-democrats-explore-electoral-college-overhaul/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (―A number of Capitol
Hill Democrats have revived proposals to reform or abolish the Electoral
College, in reaction to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton‘s
popular vote lead of more than 2.6 million over Republican President-elect
Donald Trump.‖). The Electoral College is itself rooted in the institution of
southern slavery. Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College
Exists, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4558510/electoral-college-historyslavery/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (describing the origins of the Electoral
College) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class
Structures in Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (finding that the
American criminal justice system exemplifies institutions that are deeply
affected by race, gender, and class).
4. See Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 1, 3 (Oct.
6, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (showing
the declining number of death sentences and executions); see also Texas
Executions Drop to Lowest Level in 20 Years, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 13,
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6577 (showing the statistics behind
the death penalty‘s decline in Texas).
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death penalty violates the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.5
The self-described goal of Goldfarb‘s essay: ―to cultivate a
deeper understanding of the more hidden ways that race, gender,
and class can affect the death penalty system, including the ways
it can threaten the accuracy of fact-finding on which the
legitimacy of the capital sanction depends.‖6 Capital punishment
is, let there be no doubt, meted out erratically and often errantly,7
in a racially discriminatory manner,8 and in a way that condemns
more men than women.9 And it is—and long has been—closely
5. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3. The Eighth Amendment prohibits
―cruel and unusual punishments,‖ and the Fourteenth Amendment made the
Eighth Amendment applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII & XIV.
The Eighth Amendment was first held applicable to the states in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 238 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court‘s long, tortured
relationship with capital punishment is chronicled in an important new book.
See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016). As that book notes: ―The
American death penalty has come full circle over the past fifty years. Capital
punishment was the subject of a concerted constitutional litigation campaign in
the 1960s that led to the Supreme Court‘s bold abolition in 1972, followed by its
chastened reauthorization of the death penalty four years later.‖ Id. at 3.
6. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its
Ramifications, 92 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 227 (2012) (discussing the death
penalty‘s arbitrary administration); JAMES S. LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN &
VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995
(2000) (providing statistics illustrating the American death penalty‘s
arbitrariness).
8. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns
& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383
(2006) (finding that the more stereotypically ―black‖ a defendant is perceived to
be, the more likely that person is to be sentenced to death); Lincoln Caplan,
Racial Discrimination and Capital Punishment: The Indefensible Death
Sentence of Duane Buck, NEW YORKER, Apr. 20, 2016 (discussing a prime
example of racial discrimination in death penalty litigation); Robert J. Smith,
There‟s No Separating the Death Penalty and Race, SLATE (May 5, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/foster_v_
chatman_race_infects_death_penalty_to_the_core.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (concluding that the only way to do away with racial bias in death penalty
cases is to outlaw the death penalty altogether) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
9. See Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination,
25 LAW & SOC. REV. 367 (1991); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female
Offenders, Jan. 1, 1973, through Dec. 31, 2012, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
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associated with race and poverty and invidious stereotypes and
bad lawyering.10 ―Were it not for the distortions introduced by
race, gender, and class ideologies,‖ Goldfarb concludes of the
tragic story of one former Virginia death row inmate, Joseph
Giarratano, ―his life might have been altered, and his treatment
by the criminal justice system might have been more attentive
and accurate.‖11
A victim of child abuse who fell into substance abuse and
who may have falsely confessed to a horrific rape and double
murder, Joe Giarratano is still imprisoned for a crime committed
in 1979 in Norfolk, Virginia. In February 1979, Giarratano awoke
to find the lifeless bodies of two women with whom he shared an
apartment. Michelle Kline—a fifteen-year-old girl—had been
raped and strangled in her bed, and the body of her mother, Toni,
was found in the bathroom, her carotid artery severed. A suicidal
alcoholic who frequently had blackouts and hallucinations,
Giarratano had no memory of what had happened and thus
assumed he was responsible. After confessing to the horrific
crime, giving five inconsistent confessions to police over two days,
he waived his right to a jury trial, asked to be put to death, and
was sent to death row. Only later was exculpatory forensic
evidence, including unidentified bloody bootprints, fingerprints
and hair samples, examined more closely, calling into question
the validity of Giarratano‘s admission of guilt.12
(2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FemDeathDec2012.pdf
(citing statistics showing the disproportionate number of men who are
sentenced to death and executed in comparison to women).
10. See JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTICE
197–223 (2014) (discussing racial discrimination and
arbitrariness in the death penalty‘s application); MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY REGIME 20 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow
eds. 2002) (―[C]lose to 100 percent of capital murder defendants are indigent.‖);
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (discussing
how poor people accused of capital crimes are often defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters);
Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental
Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 671–75
(2015) (describing the role played by race, poverty, intellectual disabilities and
mental illness in the death penalty‘s administration).
11. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 49–50 & n.177 (noting the costs and
effects on lives in death penalty cases and the gravity of the sentence).
12. See HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-
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In prison, Giarratano—a ninth-grade dropout who, behind
bars, transformed his life through reading literature, philosophy
and law—later advocated successfully to save the life of another
death row inmate, Earl Washington Jr. Working as a ―jailhouse‖
lawyer, Giarratano filed a section 1983 action on Washington‘s
behalf that set in motion a series of events that led to a stay of
execution for Washington and his subsequent exoneration in
2000. A black, intellectually disabled man, Washington had been
convicted of raping and murdering a young white woman,
Rebecca Williams, in her Culpeper, Virginia apartment—and he
spent seventeen years in prison before DNA evidence confirmed
his innocence.13 Giarratano was not afraid to challenge the
DEATH PENALTY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-1994, at 129 (1996); Goldfarb,
supra note 3, at 24 (discussing Joseph Giarratano‘s case); Joseph Giarratano,
WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED
GROUP
WEBSITE,
https://wronglyconvictedgroup.wordpress.com/category/4-main-cause-ofwrongful-conviction/false-confession/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe,
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY
429, 489–90 (1988):
In 1979, Norfolk, Virginia police extracted five contradictory
confessions from Joseph Giarratano to the rape and murder of fifteenyear-old Michelle Kline and her forty-four-year-old mother, Toni
Kline. Sperm, hair samples, and bloody shoeprints found at the crime
scene did not link Giarratano to the crime. In addition, Giarratano‘s
confessions were demonstrably inaccurate on significant points: One
of the victims died from a severed artery and bled profusely, but
police found no blood on Giarratano‘s clothing; the victims were
strangled and stabbed by someone who is right-handed, but
Giarratano is left-handed and has only limited use of his right hand
due to neurological damage from childhood; Giarratano confessed to
strangling one of his victims with his hands, but an independent
pathologist testified that the hallmarks of manual strangulation were
not present; Giarratano stated that he threw the knife he used into
the Kline‘s backyard, but no weapon was ever found.
13. See generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAREXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. 83–95 (2003); WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING
IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES 65 (2006);
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE
DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 87 (2008);
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL 335 (Thomas G. Bloomberg & Stanley Cohen
eds., 2d ed. 2003). Washington had given a false confession that was written up
by police detectives and signed by Washington. Washington had once come with
nine days of being executed, and he was only exonerated long after the crime
through DNA testing done by a Virginia laboratory. ROBERT P. BURNS, KAFKA‘S
LAW: THE TRIAL AND AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 104 (2014); JON B. GOULD, THE

492

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487 (2016)

system even though it might have consequences for him.
―Giarratano‘s lawsuits regarding prisoners‘ rights,‖ two authors
have observed, ―so infuriated Virginia prison officials that they
transferred Giarratano to prisons in Utah and Illinois, until his
hunger strike forced his return to Virginia.‖14
Sentenced to death after being convicted of murdering Toni
Kline and raping and murdering her 15-year-old daughter, Joe
Giarratano—a white inmate prosecuted for murdering two white
victims—spent more than ten years on the state‘s death row. He
came within a few days of execution in the electric chair before
then-Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, in a conditional pardon,
took him off death row in 1991 amid concerns about his
innocence. ―The governor had received 5,978 telephone calls and
letters urging him to spare Giarratano,‖ one newspaper reported
of the conditional pardon, which imposed a life sentence but
allowed for the possibility of parole after Giarratano served 25
years behind bars.15 Among those supporting his clemency
request: actor Mike Farrell, conservative columnist James J.
Kilpatrick, singer Joan Baez, and members of Congress. Denied a
retrial by the prosecutor though one had been urged by Governor
Wilder,16 Giarratano was later stabbed in prison but survived,17
INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29 (2008); CHRISTOPHER S. KUDLAC, PUBLIC
EXECUTIONS: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MEDIA 121 (2007).
14. See TODD C. PEPPERS & LAURA TREVVETT ANDERSON, ANATOMY OF AN
EXECUTION: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF DOUGLAS CHRISTOPHER THOMAS 146 (2009)
(discussing the Giarratano case in the context of another death penalty case).
15. Id.; Loses New Trial Bid for Haunting Crime, BRYAN TIMES (Bryan,
OH), Feb. 21, 1991, at 4; compare Jean McNair, Giarratano Studies Fine Print
of Wilder Pardon, FREE LANCE-STAR, Feb. 20, 1991, at 1 (discussing the
possibility of a pardon in the Giarratano case), with HAINES, supra note 12, at
129:
Eighty-two hours before Joe Giarratano was to be executed, Governor
Wilder offered him a deal that canceled his execution on condition
that he accept a life sentence. Should he successfully seek a retrial,
he could be sentenced to death. Giarratano accepted the offer and
appealed to the state attorney general, Mary Sue Terry, for a new
trial. That request was denied . . . .
16. In 1990, Governor L. Douglas Wilder—a man who grew up in a thensegregated Richmond—became the first black elected governor. JESSIE CARNEY
SMITH, BLACK FIRSTS: 4,000 GROUND-BREAKING AND PIONEERING HISTORICAL
EVENTS 271 (3d ed. 2013); WILLIAM P. HUSTWIT, JAMES J. KILPATRICK: SALESMAN
FOR SEGREGATION 215 (2013).
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became the named plaintiff in a well-known U.S. Supreme Court
case18 arguing for the constitutional right to counsel in habeas
corpus cases, and continues, to this day, to maintain his
innocence and to seek a new trial.19
In her essay, Professor Goldfarb speaks of ―the pervasive
racial influences on the contours of our contemporary justice
systems.‖20 In discussing the confluence of capital punishment
and race, she reminds readers of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
notorious decision in McCleskey v. Kemp.21 In that case, a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court—in an opinion authored by Justice
17. See MIKE FARRELL, JUST CALL ME MIKE: A JOURNEY TO ACTOR AND
ACTIVIST 214, 305 (2008) (describing Giarratano‘s imprisonment).
18. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
19. See JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN
MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 177 (2015); MIKE FARRELL, OF
MULE AND MAN 112 (2009); Former Death Row Inmate Giarratano Hurt in
Stabbing, FREE LANCE-STAR, July 8, 1996, at C8; The Status of Joe‟s Case, FREE
JOE GIARRATANO, http://freejoeg.com/case-status/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In 1987, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings—a holding it later affirmed, in the capital context, two
years later. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
20. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 14.
21. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Supreme Court in McCleskey considered the
case of Warren McCleskey, a black man sentenced to death in 1978 in Georgia
for killing a white police officer. McCleskey‘s lawyers argued that their client‘s
death sentence was part of a pattern of racial discrimination that violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
AMERICA‘S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 282 (2010). After the
Supreme Court rejected McCleskey‘s Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection
Clause claims, several members of Congress pushed for the passage of the
Racial Justice Act, which would have allowed capital defendants to make a
statistical showing of racial disparity in the administration of their jurisdiction‘s
capital punishment scheme. See Vada Berger, Nicole Walthour, Angela Dorn,
Dan Lindsey, Pamela Thompson & Gretchen von Helms, Too Much Justice: A
Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 438
(1989); see also THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCEBOOK ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19
(William A. Schabas ed., 1997) (―The Racial Justice Act was a modest proposal
that would have required courts to have hearings on racial disparities in
infliction of the death penalty and to look behind the disparities to determine
whether they are related to race or some other factor.‖). That legislation,
however, never passed. Id. (―Despite the pronounced racial disparities in the
infliction of the death penalty in both state and federal capital cases, Congress
refused to include the Racial Justice Act as part of the crime bill in 1994, just as
it has refused to enact the act in previous years.‖).
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Lewis Powell—upheld Warren McCleskey‘s death sentence in the
face of compelling, never-refuted statistical evidence showing that
a victim‘s race plays a major role in deciding who lives or dies.22
That decision—one Justice Powell later told his biographer he
regretted—turned a blind eye to racial bias in the death penalty‘s
administration instead of forthrightly acknowledging that
discrimination.23 ―Apparent discrepancies in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system,‖ Powell wrote in
McCleskey, asserting that ―if we accept McCleskey‘s claim that
racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing
decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other
types of penalty.‖24 ―McCleskey is the Dred Scott decision of our
time,‖ death penalty opponent Anthony Amsterdam—the famed
Supreme Court advocate and NYU law professor—once observed
of Justice Powell‘s 1987 majority opinion.25
America‘s death penalty—as Phyllis Goldfarb points out—is
closely ―intertwined‖ with issues of race, gender and class.26 ―Our
22. See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty
with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Study, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1127, 1236 (2013) (discussing the findings of the Baldus study).
23. See Justice Powell‟s New Wisdom, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/11/opinion/justice-powell-s-new-wisdom.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2016) (―Too late for Warren McCleskey and numerous other
executed prisoners, retired Justice Lewis Powell now concedes that he was
wrong to cast the deciding fifth Supreme Court vote to uphold Mr. McCleskey‘s
death sentence in a major case.‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
24. See MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (2002).
25. See Adam Liptak, New Look at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html (last visited
Dec. 15, 2016) (highlighting the case‘s lasting impact) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 6. The Central Park jogger case, in which
a 28-year-old investment banker was brutally assaulted, raped and sodomized
on April 19, 1989, leaving her in a coma for twelve days, became ―one of the
most widely publicized crimes of the 1980‘s.‖ TRISHA MEILI, I AM THE CENTRAL
PARK JOGGER (2004); M. A. Farber, „Smart, Driven‟ Woman Overcomes
Reluctance,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
17,
1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/17/nyregion/smart-driven-woman-overcomesreluctance.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). ―As the case proceeded,‖ one source notes, ―it became a symbolic
battleground for race, class, and gender issues in the late 1980s and early
1990s.‖ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME 98 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L.
Gabbidon eds., 2009). Notoriously, less than two weeks after the attack, then-
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criminal justice system,‖ she aptly notes after examining early
American history, the scourge of lynchings, and the institution of
slavery, ―was forged in America‘s racial cauldron and would not
look as it does but for our racial history.‖27 At one time, slaves
and free blacks were barred by law from testifying in court
against whites,28 slaves were hanged, gibbeted, or burned to
death for rebelling against their masters,29 and black men—even
boys—were sadistically lynched, whether for sexually assaulting
whites or for other actions, even perceived slights.30 ―Any negro or
real estate mogul Donald Trump took out full-page advertisements in New York
City newspapers that, in large capital letters, blared: ―BRING BACK THE
DEATH PENALTY.‖ SARAH BURNS, THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE: THE UNTOLD STORY
BEHIND ONE OF NEW YORK CITY‘S MOST INFAMOUS CRIMES 72 (2012); Goldie
Taylor, Donald Trump Keeps Smearing the Long-Since Exonerated Central Park
Five,
DAILY
BEAST
(Oct.
7,
2016),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/10/07/donald-trump-keepssmearing-the-long-since-exonerated-central-park-five.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (―In 1989, as five boys—four black and one Latino—stood accused of gangraping and brutally beating a white female jogger in Central Park, Trump could
not help but snatch some of the spotlight for himself at a time when tabloids
screamed about ‗wolfpacks.‘‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump
inexplicably continued to insist on the guilt of the Central Park Five despite
their exoneration more than a decade earlier. ―They admitted they were guilty,‖
Trump said to CNN in a statement even though DNA evidence had cleared them
and another man had separately confessed to the crime in 2002. Ken Burns
Blasts Trump for Insisting the Central Park 5 Are Guilty, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ken-burns-trump-centralpark-five_us_57f7ebf9e4b0e655eab3f20b (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Benjy Sarlin, Donald Trump Says
Central Park Five Are Guilty, Despite DNA Evidence, NBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-says-central-parkfive-are-guilty-despite-dna-n661941 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 14.
28. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 11 (1970).
29. See ―PRETENDS TO BE FREE‖: RUNAWAY SLAVE ADVERTISEMENTS FROM
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY xx (Graham Russell
Hodges & Alan Eward Brown eds., 1994); see also DOUGLAS R. EGERTON,
GABRIEL‘S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 1800 AND 1802
(2000).
30. See, e.g., CLIFFORD R. CALDWELL & RON DELORD, ETERNITY AT THE END
OF A ROPE: EXECUTIONS, LYNCHINGS AND VIGILANTE JUSTICE IN TEXAS 1819–1912,
at 362 (2015) (describing the torturing and burning to death of Henry Smith, a
black man lynched in Texas in 1893); ANITA PRICE DAVIS, THE MARGARET
MITCHELL ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (2013) (―Between 1882 and 1968 there were 4,742
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mulatto, bond or free,‖ read one Virginia law from 1819, ―shall be
a good witness in pleas of the Commonwealth for or against
negroes or mulattoes, bond or free, or in civil pleas where free
negroes or mulattoes shall alone be parties, and in no other cases
whatever.‖31 As the Montgomery, Alabama-based Equal Justice
Initiative emphasizes of America‘s past:
Racial terror lynchings during the period from 1877 to 1950
killed thousands of black people, marginalized people of color
politically, economically, and socially, and fueled a massive
migration of black refugees out of the South. In addition,
lynching and the era of racial terror inflicted deep trauma and
psychic wounds on survivors, families, and entire
communities.32

black lynchings in the nation. Congressman John Lewis calls the period ‗one of
the darkest and sickest periods in American history.‘‖); CHRISTOPHER METRESS,
THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE 3 (2002) (discussing
the societal impact of the lynching of Emmett Till); see also ROBERT W.
THURSTON, LYNCHING: AMERICAN MOB MURDER IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2011);
AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA, 1890-1940 (2009); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS
CONFRONT LYNCHING: STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2009). After some lynchings, lynch mob participants actually
posed for photographs with the bodies of the lynching victims and then mailed
those photographs out as postcards. WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING
PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA (James Allen ed., 2000); DORA APEL, IMAGERY OF
LYNCHING: BLACK MEN, WHITE WOMEN, AND THE MOB (2004).
31. See CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 60,
62 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. Zangrando eds., 1968) (reprinting the text of
the Virginia law, ―An act reducing into one, the several acts concerning slaves,
free Negroes, and mulattoes‖). This was the law in both Virginia and Maryland
and similar provisions were put in place in states such as Alabama, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina and Tennessee. CHARLES M. CHRISTIAN, BLACK SAGA:
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 31 (1995).
32. See History of Racial Injustice: Racial Terror Lynchings, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE,
https://eji.org/history-racial-injustice-racial-terrorlynchings.https://eji.org/history-racial-injustice-racial-terror-lynchings
(last
visited Dec. 16, 2016) (discussing the lasting impacts and effects on the lives of
those witnessing lynchings in the South) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/reports/lynching-in-america (last visited
Dec. 19, 2016) (describing how the Equal Justice Initiative documented 4,075
cases of ―racial terror lynchings‖ of African Americans in Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia between 1877 and 1950) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). ―The death penalty is a direct descendent
of lynching,‖ observes Christina Swarns of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
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Although the Declaration of Independence set lofty
aspirations for the nation, early American political rhetoric did
not line up with state practice. At its founding in 1776, the
United States of America—through its Continental Congress—
promulgated the Declaration of Independence, which famously
reads: ―We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.‖33 Yet, when a Richmond, Virginiaarea slave named Gabriel—born in 1776—plotted to gain his
freedom, vowing ―Death or Liberty,‖ he and his co-conspirators
were sent to the gallows.34 In Gabriel‘s Rebellion, its leader—a
blacksmith who had recruited compatriots in rural areas and at
black churches—became one of more than twenty slaves who
were put to death.35 Ironically, though the country was founded
on the principle of equality and the basis of natural rights,36
Native Americans and African Americans—as well as women, not
granted the right to vote until 192037—were, for many decades,
systematically excluded from the nation‘s social compact.38
―The states with the highest number of lynchings also have the highest numbers
of death-penalty executions,‖ she notes. Lonnae O‘Neal Parker, WASH. POST
(Jan.
31,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/2012/01/31/gIQAlKEPgQ_story.h
tml?utm_term=.2358d1dac6d1 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
34. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Did African-American Slaves Rebel?, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/didafrican-american-slaves-rebel/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (characterizing
Gabriel‘s Rebellion as a quest for freedom and noting that, after ―the state
captured Gabriel and several co-conspirators,‖ ―[t]wenty-five African Americans,
worth about $9,000 or so—money that cash-strapped Virginia surely thought it
could ill afford—were hanged together before Gabriel went to the gallows and
was executed‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See 1 MARY BETH NORTON, CAROL SHERIFF, DAVID M. KATZMAN, DAVID
W. BLIGHT, HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, FREDRIK LOGEVALL, BETH BAILEY & DEBRA
MICHALS, A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (8th ed.
2010) (taking note of the punishment of the rebelling slaves).
36. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM
8 (1994).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (guaranteeing women the right to vote).
38. See JANE A. GRANT, THE NEW AMERICAN SOCIAL COMPACT: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (2008) (noting that ―African
Americans, women, Native Americans, and newly arrived immigrants‖ were not
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Phyllis Goldfarb‘s ―Matters of Strata‖ is a welcome addition
to the sizeable, growing body of literature on capital punishment
and inequality.39 In examining what she calls ―the interactive role
of race, gender, and class in capital cases in general and the
Giarratano case in particular,‖40 she sheds light and insight on
the reality that race, gender stereotypes, and poverty have long
shaped—and continue to shape—America‘s death penalty system.
For example, she notes that ―abundant evidence reveals‖ that
race and the death penalty are ―powerfully intertwined.‖41 That
included in the country‘s social compact).
39. See, e.g., FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 1 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006)
[hereinafter FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE] (―By now the connection
between race and the killings of African-Americans, in particular through
lynchings and the death penalty, is widely recognized among scholars, activists,
and legal officials.‖); HOWARD W. ALLEN & JEROME M. CLUBB, RACE, CLASS, AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12 (2008) (―It is
clear that over the long sweep of American history, racial and ethnic disparity in
the use of the death penalty has been of substantial magnitude.‖); see also
PETER IADICOLA & ANSON SHUPE, VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY, AND HUMAN FREEDOM
311 (3d ed. 2013) (citations omitted):
In looking at the population of those executed by the U.S.
government, the majority have been members of ethnic populations
and generally from the poorer strata of society. Of the 211 federal
death penalty prosecutions authorized by the attorney general since
1988, 75 percent have been against minorities. The U.S. General
Accounting Office issued a report in 1990 which found that in 82
percent of the studies reviewed, race of the victim was found to
influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or being
sentenced to execution.
40. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3.
41. See id. at 6. The subject of women and capital punishment has been
written about by a number of scholars. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. O‘SHEA, WOMEN
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1998 (1999); Harry
Greenlee & Shelia P. Greenlee, Women and the Death Penalty: Racial
Disparities and Differences, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 319 (2008); Victor L.
Streib, Rare and Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 609 (2006); Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal
Protection, and the Politics of Gender in Women‟s Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 967 (2001); Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women and
the Death Penalty, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 427 (2000). The stories of
individual women sentenced to death are especially revealing of how female
offenders are often portrayed by the media. See, e.g., KATHLEEN A. CAIRNS, THE
ENIGMA WOMAN: THE DEATH SENTENCE OF NELLIE MAY MADISON (2007);
KATHLEEN A. CAIRNS, PROOF OF GUILT: BARBARA GRAHAM AND THE POLITICS OF
EXECUTING WOMEN IN AMERICA (2013); LINDA STROM, KARLA FAYE TUCKER SET
FREE: LIFE AND FAITH ON DEATH ROW (2011).
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the histories of capital punishment and lynching are inextricably
linked with racial prejudice and oppression, in fact, is amply
shown through Professor Goldfarb‘s observations about the
Scottsboro cases42 and the Southern lynch mobs that took so
many African-American lives.43 The death penalty has frequently
targeted the illiterate, the poor, the intellectually disabled, and
racial minorities, and often in not-so-subtle ways.44 And the
42. See generally LITA SORENSEN, THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS TRIAL: A PRIMARY
SOURCE ACCOUNT (2004) (discussing the case of nine young blacks accused in
Alabama of raping two white women in 1931).
43. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 12, 15 & n.57. Such lynchings—as TaNehisi Coates, a national correspondent for The Atlantic, writes—served to
―dominate and control‖ blacks, not only in the South but throughout the United
States. And the lack of accountability for such crimes was a despicable part of
the terror associated with them. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes in his book,
Between the World and Me: ―In the era of mass lynching, it was so difficult to
find who, specifically, served as executioner that such deaths were often
reported by the press as having happened ‗at the hands of persons unknown.‘‖
TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 42, 97–98 (2015). Lynchings
took place not just in the South, in states such as Alabama, Mississippi and
Texas, but in northern states like Illinois and Minnesota. See, e.g., AMY LOUISE
WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA,
1890–1940 (2011); JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND
EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA (2003) [hereinafter BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE];
PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK
AMERICA (2003).
44. At America‘s last public execution, that of a twenty-two-year-old black
man, Rainey Bethea, on August 14, 1936, in Owensboro, Kentucky,
approximately 10,000 to 20,000 people were in attendance. Bethea was hanged
for killing a 70-year-old white woman, and the scaffold was erected in a field so
that thousands could witness it. ―So many people invaded Owensboro for the
spectacle,‖ one commentator writes, ―that terrified local blacks fled the town,
especially after receiving lynching threats from drunken white revelers.‖ Ray
Moses, Persuading the Sentencing Body Not to Return a Death Verdict, 20
CHAMPION 52, 54 (1996); John P. Rutledge, The Definitive Inhumanity of Capital
Punishment, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 283, 290–91 (1998); Dane A. Drobny, Death
TV: Media Access to Executions Under the First Amendment, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
1179, 1187–88 (1992); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions
Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, 447 n.820 (1997); see also id. (noting that
under a 1920 Kentucky law providing for public hangings for the crime of rape,
―[n]ine men, eight of them black, were punished under this law between 1920
and 1938, when the law was repealed‖). As Stephen Bright—a Supreme Court
litigator and the president of the Southern Center for Human Rights—puts it of
those confined to death row:
Those awaiting their deaths are no different from those selected for
execution in the past: virtually all are poor; about half are members
of racial minorities; and the overwhelming majority were sentenced to
death for crimes against white victims. Many suffer from severe
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punishment of death—initially rooted in the Old Testament45 and
fertilized in prior centuries by then-prevailing religious
orthodoxy46 and superstition47—has long been used mainly
(almost exclusively) against men.48
This response to Professor Goldfarb‘s essay explores the
implications of her analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court‘s Eighth
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
jurisprudence
and
the
constitutionality of capital punishment. In the twenty-first
century, Americans have a growing awareness and
understanding that their criminal justice system—frequently
mental impairments or limitations, and many others were the victims
of the most brutal physical, sexual, and psychological abuse during
their childhoods.
Stephen B. Bright, ―Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty,‖ in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE
KILLING STATE , supra note 39, at 211.
45. ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN, THE DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES,
COMMENTARIES, AND CASE BRIEFS 2 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the crimes listed in
the 1641 Body of Liberties—the penal code for the Massachusetts Bay Colony—
prescribed the death penalty for twelve offenses, including idolatry, witchcraft
and blasphemy, and cited Old Testament verses as authority for proscribed
acts).
46. See, e.g., WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER (2012)
(describing the life of John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, and noting that he believed capital punishment ―was required by the
Bible in cases of murder‖).
47. In early America, executions were often conducted on Fridays. JOHN D.
BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS‘ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 266 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL]. It was during the Enlightenment—as legal historian Stuart Banner
explains—that a more ―utilitarian calculus‖ made the gallows seem like ―a
product of ignorance and superstition.‖ BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note
5, at 107.
48. E.g., Matthew B. Robinson, Assessing Scholarly Opinion of Capital
Punishment: The Experts Speak, in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 143 (Robert M.
Bohm ed., 2008) (―Perhaps the clearest evidence of gender/sex bias offered by a
death penalty expert was this response: ‗We just don‘t execute many women
(they represent 1.5% of those on death row and about 1% of those executed since
1977), even though they account for a significant proportion of murderers.‘‖).
Before Ann Bilansky—convicted of poisoning her husband, and the only woman
ever executed by the State of Minnesota—was put to death on Friday, March 23,
1860, lawmakers actually took up a bill providing, ―No woman or girl convicted
of murder in the first degree, shall suffer the penalty of death, but that
punishment in such cases shall be imprisonment in the State prison for life.‖
BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE, supra note 43, at 83–92. Had that bill become
law, it would have made only men eligible for the death penalty in the state.
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described as one of ―mass incarceration‖ and as ―overly
punitive‖—is badly in need of reform.49 There are lots of nonviolent offenders living in American prisons,50 with the rise of
private prisons perversely incentivizing incarceration and profittaking at the expense of people‘s lives.51 The American people
now know that the capital punishment ―system‖ (if it can even be
called that) is riddled with arbitrariness, error, geographic and
racial disparities, and wrongful convictions.52 After examining the
49. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4, 11–12, 188, 209 (2013); ADVANCING CRIMINOLOGY
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 8 (Thomas G. Blomberg, Julie Mestre Brancale,
Kevin M. Beaver & William D. Bales eds., 2016).
50. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA,
1975–2025, at 206 (2016).
51. See MICHAEL A. HALLETT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL RACE
PERSPECTIVE 18 (2006) (―[T]he incentive structure associated with for-profit
imprisonment dramatically readjusts the crime control formula from
attentiveness to crime-reduction strategies to acceptance and dependence upon
high crime and harsh punishment for economic viability.‖); PUNISHMENT IN
POPULAR CULTURE (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2015) (―In the
United States, where the state has outsourced the burden of providing
incarceration services to the lowest bidder—a company that has a fiduciary duty
to keep the beds full and maximize profit—there is no incentive to not lock up or
reduce recidivism.‖). In 2016, the U.S. Government announced that it would be
gradually phasing out the use of private prisons, a development that the multibillion dollar private prison industry is actively fighting. Charlie Savage, U.S. to
Phase Out Use of Private Prisons for Federal Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/us-to-phase-out-use-of-privateprisons-for-federal-inmates.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (―The Obama
administration said on Thursday that it would begin to phase out the use of
private for-profit prisons to house federal inmates.‖) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Zapotosky, DOJ Directive Riles Private
Prisons, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2016, at A5 (―The private prison industry, which
generates billions of dollars in revenue, has become a powerful lobbying force on
Capitol Hill, and officials say they have tried since the Justice Department
announcement to rally legislators to their side.‖). The election of billionaire
businessman Donald Trump in November 2016 sent shares of Corrections
Corporation of America (―CCA‖), the country‘s largest private prison company,
soaring. James Surowiecki, Trump Sets Private Prisons Free, NEW YORKER, Dec.
5, 2016, at 26 (noting that CCA‘s stock jumped forty-seven percent in the wake
of Trump‘s election).
52. See STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 72–80 (John D.
Bessler ed. 2016) (discussing arbitrariness and wrongful convictions in his 2015
dissent in Glossip v. Gross); National Polls Show Historic Declines in Support
for
Death
Penalty,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
(Apr.
2015),
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/national-polls-and-studies#Pew;CBS (last visited
Dec. 19, 2016) (―Polls released this week by Pew Research Center and CBS
News show that public support for the death penalty has declined to near
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evidence, Goldfarb is right to conclude that ―the entanglement of
race, gender, and class structures‖ in the capital decision-making
process can no longer be overlooked—and, in fact, ―hang like a
shadow over America‘s death penalty.‖53 Indeed, in the face of
miscarriages of justice, a series of high-profile botched executions,
and the long delays between death sentences and executions that
inflict severe psychological torment on death row inmates, U.N.
officials, academics and jurists, as well as members of the general
public, are starting to talk about executions not just as cruel and
unusual but through the lens of torture.54 Though the U.S.
Constitution‘s Fourteenth Amendment, as recounted below, was
intended in part to equalize the punishment of blacks and whites,
America‘s death penalty has never separated itself from its
terrifying, discriminatory past.

II. The Legacy of Slavery and Discrimination: Race, Gender and
Class in Early America
The United States of America was forged on the anvil of
liberty. The motto of the American Revolution, ―No taxation
without representation,‖ became a rallying cry for colonists
angered by taxes on stamps, sugar and tea.55 ―Those who are
taxed without consent expressed by themselves or our
representatives are slaves,‖ John Dickinson wrote in 1768,56
historic lows. Both polls reported that 56% of Americans support the death
penalty.‖) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Besty Cooper,
Rachel Lienesch & Robert P. Jones, Anxiety, Nostalgia, and Mistrust: Findings
from the 2015 American Values Survey, PRRI (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.prri.org/research/survey-anxiety-nostalgia-and-mistrust-findingsfrom-the-2015-american-values-survey/#.VlR1qN-rR7N (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (―Americans are also closely divided over whether there are racial
disparities in death penalty sentencing. A majority (53%) of Americans agree
that a black person is more likely than a white person to receive the death
penalty for the same crime, while 45% of Americans disagree.‖) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 5.
54. See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM
THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION (forthcoming 2017).
55. RORY RAVEN, BURNING THE GASPEE: REVOLUTION IN RHODE ISLAND 20–25
(2012).
56. HENRY M. GLADNEY, NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: 1768
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conveying the heart-felt sentiments of North America‘s colonists
in the wake of the Stamp Act riots of 1765 and in the lead up to
the Boston Massacre (1770) and the Boston Tea Party (1773).57
―Give me liberty or give me death!‖ Patrick Henry is said to have
forcefully declared in 1775 at St. John‘s Church in Richmond,
Virginia.58 After Paul Revere‘s midnight ride and the first shots
were fired at Concord and Lexington, Massachusetts, the
Revolutionary War (1775–1783) led to America‘s creation and the
severing of political ties with England, the mother country.59 ―The
history of the present King of Great Britain,‖ the Declaration of
Independence audaciously proclaimed, ―is a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.‖60
Yet, despite all the rhetoric about liberty and equality, the
American Revolution did not lead to freedom and equality for all.
As one source reports: ―Early America was governed primarily by
English common law, which extended the vote only to men who
possessed substantial property. Although there are no reliable
statistics for what percentage of the population met the property
qualifications in England, the number was roughly 10 percent of
adult males.‖61 It took a tumultuous and bloody Civil War before
the U.S. Constitution was amended to abolish slavery, to
guarantee ―equal protection of the laws,‖ and—in 1870—to give
African-Americans the franchise, though it took the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to end the scourge of poll taxes and
literacy tests.62 And even though Abigail Adams had insisted in a
PETITION, MEMORIAL, AND REMONSTRANCE 139 (2014).
57. JACK TAGER, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF SOCIAL VIOLENCE 15,
50 (2001).
58. AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT AND CRITICISM 19 (Thomas W. Benson
ed., 1989); ARTHUR G. SHARP, NOT YOUR FATHER‘S FOUNDERS: AN ―AMENDED‖
LOOK AT AMERICA‘S FIRST PATRIOTS 113 (2012).
59. DAVID F. MARLEY, WARS OF THE AMERICAS: A CHRONOLOGY OF ARMED
CONFLICT IN THE NEW WORLD, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 304 (1998); JOEL J. MILLER,
THE REVOLUTIONARY PAUL REVERE 190, 192–93 (2010).
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
61. DOROTHY A. MAYS, WOMEN IN EARLY AMERICA: STRUGGLE, SURVIVAL, AND
FREEDOM IN A NEW WORLD 382 (2004).
62. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (2000); MARSHA J. TYSON DARLING,
CONTROVERSIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS AND
ARTICLES ON MAJOR QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN LAW xiv (2001). The battle for civil
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March 1776 letter to her husband, John, that he and his fellow
legislators ―Remember the Ladies‖ and ―be more generous and
favourable to them‖ than their ancestors had been, the women‘s
suffrage movement had to struggle into the twentieth century
before women got the right to vote.63 Even today, residents of the
District of Columbia, where roughly half the population is black,
scandalously have no voting representation in Congress.64
Discrimination has deep roots, dating all the way back to the
era of slavery and the race-based oppression and violence directed
at indigenous peoples.65 America‘s founders viewed blacks as
inferior,66 saw Indians as ―savages,‖67 and confined women
rights played out on the streets of Selma, Alabama, in front of schools in Little
Rock, Arkansas, through the Montgomery bus boycott, on the Edmund Pettus
Bridge, at a Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina, and in the
halls of Congress. E.g., JOHN LEWIS (WITH MICHAEL D‘ORSO), WALKING WITH THE
WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998); THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL
RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2007); TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME:
TWO PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 (2014).
63. THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 10 (Alice S. Rossi
ed., 1973); ELIZABETH FROST-KNAPPMAN & KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, WOMEN‘S
SUFFRAGE IN AMERICA 425 (2005); see also JEFFREY D. SCHULTZ & LAURA VAN
ASSENDELFT, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN IN POLITICS 156 (1999) (noting that the
National Woman Suffrage Association was founded in 1869 by Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony).
64. MICHAEL K. FAUNTROY, HOME RULE OR HOUSE RULE? CONGRESS AND THE
EROSION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 202 (2003); 2015
COUNTY AND CITY EXTRA: ANNUAL METRO, CITY, AND COUNTY DATA BOOK 9
(Deirdre A. Gaquin & Mary Meghan Ryan eds., 2015). In 1970, Congress
restored the District of Columbia‘s non-voting delegate after that position had
been abolished in 1875. The delegate was given all House privileges except that
of voting on the floor. BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, STUDENT‘S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 221
(2009). To this day, the license plates of vehicles registered in the District of
Columbia bear the revolutionary motto, ―No taxation without representation.‖
TIMOTHY MASON ROBERTS, DISTANT REVOLUTIONS: 1848 AND THE CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 3 (2009).
65. The new National Museum of African American History and Culture in
Washington, D.C., meticulously documents, through thousands of artifacts, the
long history of struggle, from slavery to emancipation and from shackles to
public protest. Alicia DeSantis & Josh Williams, I, Too, Sing America: The
National Museum of African American History and Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/15/arts/design/nationalmuseum-of-african-american-history-and-culture.html?_r=0; (last visited Dec.
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See SLAVERY IN AMERICA: A READER AND GUIDE 133 (Kenneth Morgan
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largely to the domestic sphere of the household until the women‘s
liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s.68 The U.S.
Constitution itself explicitly protected the slave trade until 1808,
contained a fugitive slave clause, and counted slaves as ―three
fifths‖ persons for purposes of apportioning representation for
political institutions controlled by white men.69 Thomas
Jefferson—the principal drafter of the Declaration of
Independence—himself believed that blacks were ―much inferior‖
to whites in the ability to reason and were ―inferior to the whites
in the endowments of body and mind.‖70 Records show Jefferson
ed., 2005) (―The Founding Fathers of the United States were well aware of the
contradiction between their espousal of political liberty at the time of the
American Revolution and the continued presence of thousands of enslaved
blacks throughout the new nation.‖).
67. See FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF
RELIGION IN AMERICA 70 (2010) (―Virginians regarded Indians, for example, as
‗savages‘ and ‗infidels.‘ The epithet ‗savage‘ had a special and ignoble meaning
in English political history because it was first used against another group of
outsiders, the Irish.‖).
68. Compare COKIE ROBERTS, FOUNDING MOTHERS: THE WOMEN WHO RAISED
OUR NATION 12 (2004) (―Though many of the marriages of the Founders, like
that of Abigail and John Adams, were true partnerships, the women had no
legal rights. Under a system called ‗couverture,‘ their husbands essentially
owned women.‖), with KATHLEEN C. BERKELEY, THE WOMEN‘S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1999) (describing the women‘s liberation movement,
feminism, and the history of the struggle for women‘s rights).
69. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 307; MICHAEL STOKES
PAULSEN & LUKE PAULSEN, THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION 75 (2015).
70. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE
AGE OF JEFFERSON 266 (3d ed. 2014). Early U.S. presidents—among them,
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew
Jackson, John Tyler, James Polk and Zachary Taylor—owned slaves. Both
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, for example, owned hundreds of
slaves during their lifetimes, with Jefferson‘s wife, Martha, bringing more than
100 slaves as part of her dowry. GRAEME DONALD, LOOSE CANNONS: 101 MYTHS,
MISHAPS AND MISADVENTURES OF MILITARY HISTORY 241 (2011); SHANE
MOUNTJOY, CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORTH AND
SOUTH 22 (2009); TRUDI STRAIN TRUEIT, THOMAS JEFFERSON 34 (2010); Robert
Blair St. George, ―Placing Race at Jefferson‘s Monticello,‖ in CULTURAL MEMORY
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY 251 (Dan Ben-Amos & Liliane Weissberg
eds., 1999). At the time of George Washington‘s death, 317 slaves owned by
Washington himself were living at Mount Vernon. Another 153 slaves at Mount
Vernon were dower slaves from the estate of Martha Washington‘s first
husband, Daniel Parke Custis. Ten Facts About Washington and Slavery,
George Washington‘s Mount Vernon, http://www.mountvernon.org/georgewashington/slavery/ten-facts-about-washington-slavery (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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owned more than 600 slaves, including boys, aged 10 to 16, who
worked from dawn to dusk making nails at Monticello, and who
were sometimes whipped by an overseer.71
Colonial and early American slave codes, reflective of the
widespread fear of slave rebellions, provided for death sentences
for felonies such as insurrection, murder, rape, poisoning, arson,
and assaulting a white person.72 ―Codes also applied to free
blacks and mulattos, not just slaves,‖ one sources recalls,
emphasizing: ―The specific provisions in codes frequently used
inclusive language to apply laws to ‗all negroes,‘ such that free
blacks were affected by slave code provisions.‖ ―Some slave
codes,‖ The Cambridge History of Law in America observes, ―also
included penalties for whites who attempted to aid blacks in
insurrection attempts or enticed slaves to run away from their
masters.‖73 ―Before the Civil War,‖ yet another source notes,
―each Southern state had a slave code, which was a system of
laws designed to safeguard property rights in slavery and to
protect the white community against insurrection.‖74 In an 1852
speech in Rochester, New York, the great orator, newspaper
71. NATALIE BOBER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: DRAFTSMAN OF A NATION 229
(2008); Karen Grigsby Bates, Life at Jefferson‟s Monticello, as His Slaves Saw It,
NPR (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/11/148305319/life-atjeffersons-monticello-as-his-slaves-saw-it (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with
the
Washington
and
Lee
Law
Review);
Nailery,
MONTICELLO,
https://www.monticello.org/site/plantation-and-slavery/nailery (last visited Dec.
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
72. CHRISTIAN, supra note 31, at 28. For example, South Carolina adopted a
slave code in 1712 that was revised at various points thereafter. South
Carolina‘s slave code, which became a model for others, made it punishable by
death to entice a slave to run away or for a slave to attempt to flee the
jurisdiction. Id. at 27. Under the code, no owner was to be punished if a slave
were to die under punishment, with the administration of corporal punishments
a prominent feature of the slave code. Id. As one source notes:
Any slave absconding or successfully evading capture for twenty days
is to be publicly whipped for the first offense, branded with the letter
R on the right check for the second offense, and lose one ear if absent
thirty days for the third offense, and for the fourth offense, a male
slave is to be castrated, a female slave is to be whipped, branded on
the left cheek with the letter R, and lose her left ear.
Id.
73. 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 271 (Michael Grossberg
& Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
74. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN SOCIETY 779 (Gerald D. Jaynes
ed., 2005).
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editor and abolitionist Frederick Douglass pointed out that
―[t]here are seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia which, if
committed by a black man (no matter how ignorant he be),
subject him to the punishment of death; while only two of the
same crimes will subject a white man to the like punishment.‖75
In other words, the rhetoric of equality did not match up with
the reality of how people were treated. In a still little-known fact,
many of America‘s Founding Fathers—indeed, the Continental
Congress as a whole—embraced the writings of, and proudly
quoted, the Italian philosopher and criminal-law theorist Cesare
Beccaria (1738–1794), the first Enlightenment thinker to make a
comprehensive case against capital punishment.76 In Dei delitti e
delle pene (1764), translated into English as An Essay on Crimes
and Punishments (1767), Beccaria argued for proportion between
crimes and punishments, opposed torture and the death penalty,
and stressed that laws should be applied to all persons in an
equal manner. Widely regarded as the founder of modern
criminology, Beccaria believed that laws should be as clear and
precise as possible, thereby reducing judicial discretion, the need
for interpretation of the laws, and capricious decisions.77 Beccaria
favored milder, more certain punishments, calling for certainty
over severity in penal codes.78 As Jefferson, channeling Beccaria,
once put it: ―Let mercy be the character of the law-giver, but let
the judge be a mere machine.‖79
In early America, the rhetoric-reality disconnect was
palpable and very wide. One of the Founding Fathers‘ favorite
quotes from Beccaria: ―In every human society there is an effort
75. AFRICAN INTELLECTUAL HERITAGE: A BOOK OF SOURCES 637–38 (Molefi
Kete Asante & Abu S. Abarry eds., 1996).
76. John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial America
to the Present, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245, 247–52 (2014); John D. Bessler, The
Economist and the Enlightenment: How Cesare Beccaria Changed Western
Civilization, 42 EUR. J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2016).
77. SHAHID M. SHAHIDULLAH, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
GLOBAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES 140 (2014); John D. Bessler, Cesare Beccaria:
A 26-Year-Old Who Enlightened Our Founding Fathers, 20 ITALIAN AM. 28
(2015).
78. CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
60 (Werner J. Einstadter & Stuart Henry eds., 2006).
79. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A
BIOGRAPHY 126 (1970).
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continually tending to confer on one part of the height of power
and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of
weakness and misery. The intent of good laws is to oppose this
effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.‖ Yet,
America‘s founders—merchants, land speculators, lawyers,
physicians and plantation owners—were themselves wealthy
elites, some spectacularly well-to-do, who tolerated—and in many
cases, profited handsomely from—human bondage.80 As Phyllis
Goldfarb reminds us: ―slavery constructed the meaning of race in
America for more than two centuries‖ and America‘s social and
political history—from colonial days through the era of Jim
Crow—led to ―[s]tereotypes about black people,‖ with prevailing
gender and class ideologies also byproducts of the nation‘s
complex history.81 In describing the legacies of slavery and
lynching, the ongoing societal problem of domestic violence, and
class bias, ―Matters of Strata‖ reminds us that the past is not
past—not by a long shot.82
80. JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN
PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 8, 16 (2014); PAUL FINKELMAN,
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 31, 135
(3d ed. 2014); The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview, NAT‘L ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_overvie
w.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2016) (listing the occupations of the Founding
Fathers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
81. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 7–8, 30–42.
82. See id. at 7–9, 33–34, 38 (describing the struggles of the
disadvantaged). For an in-depth examination of the issue of race in American
law, see F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND
QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2010). The tactless invective and racially charged rhetoric of
Donald Trump in his recent presidential campaign are a stark reminder that
racial and gender stereotypes are still very much a part of the fabric of
American life. From his presidential announcement speech on June 16, 2015, in
which he spoke of Mexican migrants as drug traffickers, criminals and ―rapists,‖
to his call for ―a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States,‖ to the third and final presidential debate, in which Trump spoke of ―bad
hombres‖ and called Hillary Clinton ―a nasty woman,‖ Trump‘s coarse,
insensitive language exemplify the kind of race and gender ideologies about
which Professor Goldfarb writes. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 7, 31; Michelle Ye
Hee Lee, Donald Trump‟s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and
Crime, WASH. POST. (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexicanimmigrants-and-crime/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing Donald Trump‘s
comments regarding Mexicans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN
(Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-
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In fact, the legal concept of ―cruel and unusual punishments‖
that jurists still wrestle with today—one rooted linguistically in
the English Bill of Rights (1689) and the Virginia Declaration of
Rights (1776), out of which the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth
Amendment came—itself became closely associated with slavery.
For example, Alabama once had a law prohibiting the infliction of
―cruel or unusual punishment‖ on any slave, making the offense
punishable by a fine of fifty to one thousand dollars.83 Likewise, a
law from Mississippi—from 1822—also prohibited the ―cruel or
unusual punishment‖ of a slave, though the fine in that state
could not exceed five hundred dollars.84 While a South Carolina
law from 1740 prohibited the ―cruel punishment‖ of slaves, an
early Louisiana statute set an ―unusual rigor‖ standard for their
treatment.85 By the 1850s and early 1860s, the ―cruel or unusual‖
and ―cruel and unusual‖ terminology had become a standard
usage for the prevailing legal duty to safeguard slaves—not for
their own sake, but to protect the property interests of
slaveholders.86 White plantation owners were concerned about
ban-immigration/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing Trump‘s comments
regarding Muslims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Erin
McCann & Johan Engel Bromwich, „Nasty Woman‟ and „Bad Hombres‟: The Real
Debate
Winners?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
20,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/us/politics/nasty-woman-and-bad-hombresthe-real-debate-winners.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (discussing Trump‘s
comments during the third presidential debate) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The concept of the other—whether used in law or politics
to demean, disparage or dehumanize whole groups or individuals—is one that is
employed to either generate fear (e.g., the Willie Horton 1988 attack ad run
against presidential candidate Michael Dukakis) or to justify exploitation or
mistreatment, even genocide or executions. ANTHONY SANTORO, EXILE AND
EMBRACE: CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE ON THE DEATH PENALTY 96
(2013); ALLAN D. COOPER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF GENOCIDE 28–32 (2009); accord
LOIS PRESSER, WHY WE HARM 34 (2013) (noting that ―victims of the 1994
Rwanda genocide were most often labeled as cockroaches, or inyenzi‖). As the
infamous ―Willie Horton Ad,‖ connecting race and the death penalty, began:
―Bush and Dukakis on crime: Bush supports the death penalty for first-degree
murderers. Dukakis not only opposed the death penalty, he allowed first-degree
murderers to have weekend passes from prison.‖ FRANK W. BAKER, POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS AND POLITICAL ADVERTISING: A MEDIA LITERACY GUIDE 122 (2009).
83. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 216–18.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 217–18, 314.
86. Id. at 216–18; see also Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the
Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94
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their property and their profits, and injured or maimed slaves—
unable to be as productive in cotton fields—were less valuable to
slave owners.87
The class ideologies Professor Goldfarb identifies and
discusses in ―Matters of Strata‖ certainly find audible echoes in
the historical record. Under the English common-law doctrine of
―benefit of clergy,‖ for example, literate citizens were once spared
from execution altogether. As Bryan Garner, the editor of Black‟s
Law Dictionary, notes: ―By invoking the benefit of clergy—
usually by reading the so-called neck verse—a defendant could
have the case transferred from the King‘s Court (which imposed
the death penalty for a felony) to the Ecclesiastical Court (which
dispensed far milder punishment).‖88 ―The test for benefit of
clergy,‖ another source points out, ―came to be one of literacy, in
which the court required the accused to read the text of the fiftyfirst Psalm.‖89 ―In due time,‖ that criminology textbook adds of
that neck verse, ―illiterate common criminals committed the
psalm to memory so that they could pretend to read it and thus
avoid the punishments of the king‘s courts.‖90 The life-saving
N.C. L. REV. 817, 834–50 (2016) (arguing that the ―cruel and unusual
punishments‖ terminology was intertwined with pre- and post-Revolutionary
War notions of permissible limits on the treatment of slaves). As Alexander
Reinert, a law professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, emphasizes:
the State of Georgia at one time also prohibited anyone from willfully murdering
a slave, and from ―inflict[ing] any other cruel punishments, other than by
whipping or beating . . . or by putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning such
slave.‖ Id. at 837. ―By the middle of the nineteenth century,‖ he adds,
―numerous legislative provisions protected against ‗cruel‘ or ‗unusual‘
punishments (or both) including laws in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and
the Territories of Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, Utah, and New Mexico.‖ Id. at
838–39.
87. See TIMOTHY JAMES LOCKLEY, LINES IN THE SAND: RACE AND CLASS IN
LOWCOUNTRY GEORGIA 1750–1860, at 99 (2001):
[W]hereas assaults by whites on whites were regarded fairly leniently
by the criminal courts, violent acts that crossed the race divide were
treated much more seriously. Physical violence carried out by
nonslaveholding whites against bondspeople, and vice versa, merited
intense scrutiny. Bondspeople were, of course, property, and injured
or maimed slaves were temporarily or permanently unable to fulfill
their normal duties.
88. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER‘S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 107 (2011).
89. LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & BRADLEY D. EDWARDS, INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 389 (8th ed. 2015).
90. Id.
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Psalm 51 read: ―Have mercy upon me, O God, / according to thy
loving kindness, / According to the multitude of thy tender mercies
/ blot out my transgressions.‖91 Although the U.S. Congress
abolished the benefit of clergy privilege in 1790, it was not
eliminated in England until 1827 and remained available in
North Carolina until 1854.92 While many elites, such as
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr, fought duels to settle their
grievances, common, impoverished criminals often met their ends
at the end of a noose.93
Racial conflict or tensions have long dominated American
life. For example, the ―Scottsboro boys‖—nine young blacks
accused of raping two white girls on a train in 1931—were
notoriously put on trial in Scottsboro, Alabama, and found guilty
of the crime despite the lack of any meaningful access to counsel
for their defense.94 The judge sentenced eight of the nine
defendants to death, only sparing one of the defendants—a

91.
92.

Id.
JAMES W. ELY, JR. & THEODORE BROWN, JR., LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW
JACKSON 213 (1987).
93. JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 159 (2002); JENNIFER GRABER, THE FURNACE OF AFFLICTION: PRISONS
AND RELIGION IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 18 (2011).
94. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) (referring to the
Scottsboro defendants as ―negroes charged with the crime of rape, committed
upon the persons of two white girls,‖ and noting that ―no counsel had been
employed‖). In Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that ―the trial judge, in
response to a question, said that he had appointed all the members of the bar for
the purpose of arraigning the defendants, and then, of course, anticipated that
the members of the bar would continue to help the defendants if no counsel
appeared.‖ Id. The Court noted that ―[e]ach of the three trials was completed
within a single day,‖ and that ―[t]he juries found defendants guilty and imposed
the death penalty upon all.‖ Id. at 50. In considering the denial of counsel claim,
the Court specifically wrote that a member of the local bar had ―on the morning
of the trial‖ offered to help a non-resident lawyer who himself had no chance to
prepare a proper defense. ―[U]ntil the very morning of the trial,‖ the Court
pointed out, however, ―no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to
represent the defendants.‖ Id. at 56. As the Court described the scene: ―The
defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled
back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime
regarded with especial horror in the community where they were to be tried,
were thus put in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the
first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.‖
Id. at 57–58; see also id. at 58 (―Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that
defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.‖).
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twelve-year-old boy considered to be too young to die.95 Later, the
U.S. Supreme Court—in Powell v. Alabama96—ordered a new
trial, finding that it was the state‘s responsibility, under the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause, to provide counsel
for defendants in capital cases. ―It was the duty of the court
having their cases in charge,‖ the Supreme Court ruled, noting
that the Scottsboro defendants were illiterate, ―to see that they
were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial.‖97 Four of the
young men were released and eventually—as one source notes—
―all of the Scottsboro Boys were paroled, freed, or pardoned,
except for one, who was tried and convicted of rape and given the
death penalty four times.‖98
95. See id. at 50. In other places and in different circumstances, other black
youths—some not even in their teens—were also sentenced to death or executed.
For example, in 1828 in New Jersey, a twelve-year-old slave, James Guild, was
executed for murdering a white grandmother from a prominent family. George
Stinney, a 14-year-old black youth, was also executed in South Carolina in 1944
for murdering two young white girls. FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 43 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989).
96. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
97. Id. at 52; see also id. at 71–72:
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion—the
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the
circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close
surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that
their friends and families were all in other states and communication
with them necessarily difficult, and, above all, that they stood in
deadly peril of their lives . . . we think the failure of the trial court to
give them reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a
clear denial of due process . . . .
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel and is
incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law, and that duty is not discharged by an
assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude
the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already
adverted to, that there are certain immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of
the Union may disregard.
98. CHARLES J. SHIELDS, MOCKINGBIRD: A PORTRAIT OF HARPER LEE 117
(2006); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 432 (Molefi Kete Asante & Ama
Mazama eds., 2005); JAMES MORTON, JUSTICE DENIED: EXTRAORDINARY
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE ch. 6 (2015). After the latter young man, Haywood
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The poor have never fared particularly well in criminal
justice systems. Before Gideon v. Wainwright,99 American states
didn‘t even afford indigent criminal defendants with counsel at
trial. In Chambers v. State of Florida,100 the U.S. Supreme
Court—in writing of the origins and importance of protections for
criminal suspects and defendants set forth in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments—had this to say in 1940 about
punishment and the indigent:
The rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement,
protracted questioning and cross questioning, and other
ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular
had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds
along the way to the cross, the guillotine, the stake and the
hangman‘s noose. And they who have suffered most from
secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the
poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the friendless, and
the powerless.101

The Supreme Court in Chambers went on to speak of ―the
basic principle‖ of law ―that all people must stand on an equality
before the bar of justice in every American court.‖102 The stocks,
the pillory and the whipping post, of course, are most closely
associated with early Anglo-American punishment of society‘s
poor and downtrodden, be they slaves, sharecroppers or
laborers.103
In assessing the death penalty, the state‘s ultimate sanction,
experts have made these representative statements about who
ends up in the criminal justice system and who actually gets
Patterson, escaped from an Alabama prison where he was laboring on a prison
farm, he fled to Atlanta, then Chattanooga, before making his way to Detroit.
After his apprehension by the FBI, Michigan‘s governor—standing on
principle—refused to allow Patterson to be extradited, however. Patterson later
ended up in a barroom brawl that resulted in a stabbing death, and he died in
jail of lung cancer in 1952 after being convicted of manslaughter in a third
trial—the first having ended in a hung jury and the second in a mistrial. THE
SCOTTSBORO BOYS IN THEIR OWN WORDS: SELECTED LETTERS, 1931–1950, at 308
(Kwando M. Kinshasa ed., 2014).
99. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
100. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
101. Id. at 235–38.
102. Id. at 241.
103. See, e.g., CHARLES C. BOLTON, POOR WHITES OF THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH:
TENANTS AND LABORERS IN CENTRAL NORTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI 62 (1994).
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effective legal representation: ―The effects of social class
permeate society, from prenatal care to school to access to mental
health services to the ability to hire top notch legal
representation. Many of the effects of social class occur before
engagement with the criminal justice system.‖ ―A relevant aspect
of social class, maybe the main one, is whether or not the
individual has the money to mount an effective defense.‖ ―The
poor cannot afford good legal representation, and a good lawyer
makes a great deal of difference.‖ ―With very few exceptions, only
the poor are executed.‖ ―Those without the capital get the
punishment.‖ ―The criminal justice system knows who pays for
it—and no place in the world are they the poor.‖104 As Professor
Goldfarb sums up one of the lessons of history: ―being poor in
America may include being disproportionately subject to

104. MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 139–40 (Robert M.
Bohm ed., 2008). Often against all odds, despite the chronic shortage of counsel
willing to represent death row inmates, the volunteer, post-conviction lawyers
who take on these death penalty cases can achieve successes for their pro bono
clients. See, e.g., Robin Maher, Volunteer Lawyers and Their Extraordinary Role
in the Delivery of Justice to Death Row Prisoners, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 519, 519
(2004) (―[I]t is something of a small miracle when we find the exceptional
individuals whose belief in justice moves them past the obstacles that stop
others.‖); Steven M. Pincus, “It‟s Good to Be Free”: An Essay about the
Exoneration of Albert Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 27 (2001) (recounting an
exoneration fight); May Lynn Smith, ―Life After Death Row: The Resurrection of
Damon
Thibodeaux‖
STARTRIBUNE
(Aug.
2,
2015),
http://www.startribune.com/life-after-death-row-damon-thibodeaux-sresurrection/318969021/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (describing the exoneration
of former Louisiana death row inmate Damon Thibodeaux due to the work of a
team of Minnesota lawyers, led by Minneapolis attorney Steve Kaplan, after
Thibodeaux spent 16 years behind bars); Steven Z. Kaplan, Why Death Is
Different: Minnesota‟s Experiment with Capital Punishment, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1113, 1113–14 (2004) (―[W]e now witness what has become nearly
commonplace: the exoneration by DNA testing of an inmate sentenced to death
or life imprisonment years ago for a capital offense that he did not commit.‖).
But the poor quality of trial representation in capital cases is legendary, leading
the American Bar Association to call for a halt to executions and to put in place
lengthy guidelines in an effort to deal with ineffective assistance of counsel. THE
STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2007–2008, at 156 (Victor Streib ed., 2008);
American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003); Russell
Stetler & Aurélie Tabuteau, The ABA Guidelines: A Historical Perspective, 43
HOFSTRA L. REV. 731 (2015); see also Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in
Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (2008).
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unjustified punishment, even lethal punishment.‖105 In that
regard, the impulse behind the motto carved on the U.S. Supreme
Court building—―Equal Justice Under Law‖—has yet to be
actualized.106
III. From Black Codes to Civil Rights and Constitutional
Protection
A major blow to the inequality of punishments was struck
with the passage by the United States Congress of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.107 Section 1 of that Act provided in part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens,
of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, . . . to full and equal benefit of
the laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Section 2 of the Act, setting forth penalties for violations of it,
further provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be
subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery
105. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 39.
106. LAURA LORIA, WHAT IS THE JUDICIAL BRANCH? 11 (2016).
107. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866), reenacted,
Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 144 (May 31, 1870) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982); see also The Civil Rights Bill, BELMONT CHRONICLE, Apr.
19, 1866, at 2 (―This law, which was passed by an imposing vote in both Houses,
38 to 15 in the Senate, and 122 to 41 in the House, unquestionably expresses the
profound determination of the people of the United States. They conferred
freedom, and they have now defined what they mean by freedom.‖).
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or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for any crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of
white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
both, in the discretion of the court.108

That 1866 legislation—in the words of one newspaper—was
―conceded by everyone to be the most important measure brought
before Congress since the passage of the constitutional

108. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. 27, 27. The Civil Rights
Act of 1866—reenacted in 1870 after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment—is currently codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states that
―[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(emphasis added); see also Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701,
722 (1989):
[T]he 41st Congress reenacted the substance of the 1866 Act in the
Fourteenth Amendment statute, the Enforcement Act of 1870. 16
Stat. 144. Section 16 of the 1870 Act was modeled after § 1 of the
1866 Act. Section 17 reenacted with some modification the criminal
provisions of § 2 of the earlier civil rights law, and § 18 of the 1870
Act provided that the entire 1866 Act was reenacted. We have thus
recognized that present day 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is both a Thirteenth and
a Fourteenth Amendment statute.
(citations omitted); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30 n.7 (1948) (―The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was reenacted in § 18 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144,
passed subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖); Johnson v.
Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1221 (8th Cir. 1978) (―In 1868 Congress declared that
the fourteenth amendment had been validly ratified by the requisite number of
states, and in 1870 Congress adopted new civil rights legislation which included
a virtual reenactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖). Section 1981 and section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code were enacted in different factual
contexts. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana,
410 F. Supp. 873, 907 (C.D. Cal. 1976):
The scope of the two prohibitions is radically different. Section 1983
is a dragnet clause embracing constitutional violations of every type
and description provided that state action is involved. Section 1981 is
confined to violations involving racial discrimination independent of
the existence of state action. Section 1981 is founded upon the
Thirteenth Amendment; section 1983 is founded upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. Section 1981 is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866;
section 1983 is a part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.
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amendment abolishing slavery.‖109 The U.S. Constitution‘s
Thirteenth Amendment, signed by President Abraham Lincoln on
February 1, 1865, and ratified by the requisite number of states
in December 1865, contained two sections. Section 1, drafted in
the wake of Lincoln‘s Emancipation Proclamation, read simply:
―Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.‖ And the sole sentence of section 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment provided: ―Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖110 ―The
Thirteenth Amendment,‖ one scholar writes, ―is unusual in that
it is one of the few provisions of the U.S. Constitution that
regulates the power and conduct of private individuals.‖111
In introducing the bill to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866
less than three weeks after the Secretary of State certified the
Thirteenth Amendment‘s ratification, Senator Lyman Trumbull
of Illinois—then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee—said that it would secure the ―great fundamental
109. The Equality of Negroes and Indians—Important Legislation—Passage
of Judge Trumbull‟s Bill, LOUISVILLE DAILY COURIER, Feb. 6, 1866, at 1; see also
The Protection of Civil Rights, CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, Feb. 6, 1866, at 1:
Not the least important of the many measures by which the good men
and true of the present Congress are laboring to conserve and
perpetuate, in the interest of freedom, the result of the war, is Judge
Trumbull‘s bill to protect the liberty and civil rights of all our citizens,
and to furnish the means for the vindication of these rights.
Protection of Civil Rights, EBENSBURG ALLEGHENIAN, Feb. 8, 1866, at 2:
The following important bill, guaranteeing protection of civil rights to
all citizens of the United States, was taken up in the Senate on
Friday, and passed by a vote of 33 to 12 . . . . This bill expressly
recognizes the colored natives of this county as citizens of the United
States, and, as such, guarantees to them every civil right, equally
with other citizens, allowing no State or other local authority to
oppress or degrade them, or in any manner subject them to
disabilities or indignities. In short, this bill fulfills the pledges given
in President Lincoln‘s two Proclamations of Freedom, and in the
passage of the Constitutional Amendment of last Session.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; CHRISTIAN G. SAMITO, LINCOLN AND THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 103 (2015) (noting President Lincoln‘s signing of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
111. 2 DAVID SCHULTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
735 (2010).
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rights.‖ Those rights were said to include ―the right to acquire
property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to
enforce rights in court, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property.‖ ―[A]ny statute which is not equal to all, and
which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to
other citizens,‖ Senator Trumbull told his fellow legislators, ―is an
unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of
servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.‖112 Section 1
of the Act was intended to prohibit all racially motivated
deprivations of the rights listed in the statute, although only
those acts perpetrated ―under color of law‖ were to be criminally
punishable under section 2. Senator Trumbull described section 2
as ―the valuable section of the bill so far as protecting the rights
of freedmen is concerned.‖ The legislative history of the 1866
Act—as courts have made clear—manifested the intent of
Congress ―to abolish all the remaining badges and vestiges of the
slavery system,‖ ―to provide for equality of rights between
persons of different races,‖ and ―to prevent racial discrimination
by both public and private parties.‖113
The passage of that legislation over President Andrew
Johnson‘s veto114 was seen in the South as the death-knell of
112. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 408 F. Supp. 916, 920 (S.D. Tex.
1976).
113. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 715–16 (1989);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426, 431–32 (1968); Mahone v.
Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1030 (3d Cir. 1977); Perry v. Gold & Laine, P.C., 371 F.
Supp.2d 622, 628 (D. N.J. 2005); Keller v. City of Portland, No. CV-98-263-ST,
1998 WL 1060222 at *12 (D. Ore. Nov. 13, 1998); Dartmouth Review v.
Dartmouth College, 709 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D. N.H. 1989); Mosher v. City of
Lakewood, 807 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); White v. A D M Milling
Co., 93 F.R.D. 872, 874 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Heff T Haul v. Sanitary Dist., No. 88 C
8990, 1989 WL 135209 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 1989).
114. See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 137 (2014) (―On March 27, President
Johnson‘s veto of the Civil Rights Bill exploded across newspaper headlines
throughout the United States, with many papers printing his accompanying
message in full.‖); Spiess, 408 F. Supp. at 923–24:
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill and sent a message to
Congress stating his reasons on March 27, 1866. . . . Upon return of
the bill to the Senate, Senator Trumbull replied to the veto message
on April 4. The veto was overridden on April 6 in the Senate by a
margin of 33 to 15, and on April 9 in the House by a margin of 122 to
41. One year after the Civil War had ended, the 1866 Civil Rights Act
was enacted into law on April 9, 1866.
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state sovereignty.115 The Intelligencer, a pro-slavery newspaper in
Anderson, South Carolina, described the bill‘s final passage this
way: ―The House of Representatives, as intimated in our last
issue, passed the Civil Rights bill over the President‘s veto, and
by an overwhelming vote. Yeas, 122—nays 41. Upon the
announcement of the vote there was great excitement, and the
cheering lasted several minutes.‖ As that southern newspaper,
which called the law ―unconstitutional and disgraceful to AngloSaxon blood,‖ described the scene: ―The galleries were crowded,
and the floor of the House was filled with privileged persons. The
number of Senators attracted thither was so large as to have left
that body almost without a quorum.‖ ―The first section of the Bill,
as it passed,‖ The Intelligencer emphasized, ―contains the most
important feature, embodying the ‗Rights‘ conferred.‖116
The intent behind the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was to
prohibit discrimination; to put blacks on equal footing in the
courts and as regard property rights; and to equalize
punishments for whites and minorities.117 As the Chicago
115. The Civil Rights Bill, WILMINGTON DAILY DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 1866, at 2
(―The Civil Rights Bill having passed both Houses of Congress by decided
majorities, may be considered a law of the land, there being scarcely a shadow of
a doubt that the President will give it a signature.‖); id. (―The passage of this
bill is a death-blow to State sovereignty, and annuls all acts of our State
Legislature in relation to the blacks except the one prohibiting negro suffrage.‖);
id. (―This bill, except in the matter of suffrage, places the negro on an equality
with the white man in every State of the Union . . . .‖); Proceedings of Congress
Yesterday, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 10, 1866, at 2 (―The civil rights bill, which last
week passed the Senate over the President‘s veto, was called up in the House,
and also passed that body by the required two-thirds vote—yeas 122, nays 41. It
is, therefore, a law, and takes effect at once.‖).
116. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–69 (1976); Passage of the Civil
Rights Bill, INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 19, 1866, at 2. The Intelligencer—located in a
former Confederate state and opposing the racial equality promised by the
legislation—had this to say about the law‘s passage: ―How the heart sickens at
the sight of an American Congress,—in a land of boasted enlightenment and
intelligence,—placing the wooly-headed negroes of the South upon an equal
footing with the white race!‖ Id. The publisher of The Intelligencer served in the
Confederate Army during the Civil War, rising to the rank of colonel. AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS IN THE SOUTH, 1911–1994, at 136 (James Roger Sharp &
Nancy Weatherly Sharp eds., 1999).
117. Civil Rights and Citizenship, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1866, at 2:
The act is drawn with masterly skill, and is calculated to accomplish
the noble object for which it was originated. Now, as heretofore, we
give our unqualified assent to this necessary measure. It is demanded
by the circumstances which the war entailed upon us, and the
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Tribune, writing more than a century later, described the law‘s
purpose: ―In 1866 Congress passed the first civil rights act.
Specifically designed to wipe out the hardships imposed by the
‗black codes,‘ it provided that Negroes should have the same right
as white men ‗to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, . . . and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statutes, ordinance, regulations, or custom to the contrary
notwithstanding.‖118 The principal problem addressed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia later emphasized, ―was the refusal of the recently
defeated southern states to accord equal legal protection to
blacks.‖119
immortal act of emancipation would be incomplete without it.
118. CHICAGO TRIB., May 19, 1968, at 7; see also GOVERNMENT
DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION (2016):
In order to neutralize the ―Black Codes‖ by guaranteeing African
Americans equal protection of the law, Republican leaders of the 39th
Congress proposed and led the victorious enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, overriding President Johnson‘s veto. The
Act was an effective legislative repeal of the Supreme Court‘s Dred
Scott decision . . . .
119. Banks v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 802 F.2d 1416, 1438
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Buckley, J., concurring); cf. id. at 1437:
Section 1983 was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. As the Supreme Court observed in
Garcia, ―[t]he specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was the campaign of violence and deception in the South,
fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens
their civil and political rights.‖ The legislative history of this statute
establishes that Congress wanted to stop the murders, lynchings, and
whippings perpetrated by lawless elements in the South, as well as
eliminate ―the refuge that local authorities extended to the authors of
these outrageous incidents.‖
(citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) & Eugene Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1334
(1952)); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 802 (1966) (―Between 1866 and
1870 there was much agitated criticism in the Congress and in the Nation
because of the continued denial of rights to Negroes, sometimes accompanied by
violent assaults. In response to the demands for more stringent legislation
Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870.‖). The Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, ―as indicated by the name, was directed at the Ku Klux Klan.‖
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND CRIME 437 (Helen Taylor Greene & Shaun L.
Gabbidon eds., 2009). As one source notes:
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As another newspaper put it more contemporaneously, in the
same year as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
There has been urged against it a single objection, puerile in
itself, if anything infamous could be regarded as frivolous. It is
charged that in certain States there are crimes which, when
committed by black men, are punished with more severity
than when they are committed by white persons. And this bill,
it is said, will interfere with the right of a State to inflict its
own degree of punishment for offences.120

As that newspaper, Washington, D.C.‘s National Republican,
concluded:
We are aware that it does this, and commend it on this
account. It deals with guilt as the great God deals with it,
without ―respect of persons.‖ Civilization and Christianity
alike require that the penalty for wrong-doing shall be meted
out in accordance to the weight and nature of the crime rather
than depend for its severity upon the color of the criminal.
That perfidy finds no sanction in this measure.121

The so-called ―Black Codes‖ were a series of laws put in place by
state legislatures in the South between 1865 and 1866.122
The Ku Klux Klan was a series of loosely affiliated gangs who used
violence to impose their agenda on the state governments established
following the Civil War by killing freed slaves and those supporting
them. The act, aiming particularly as conspiracies, made it a federal
offense to deny a person his or her civil rights.
Id.; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2004):
Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] authorizes Congress to
create a cause of action through which the citizen may vindicate his
Fourteenth Amendment rights. One of the first pieces of legislation
passed under Congress‘s § 5 power was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April
20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, entitled ―An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other Purposes.
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 610 n.25
(1979) (―The Act of 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed at the
organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South led by the Klan, and the
unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the widespread violence.‖).
120. Civil Rights and Citizenship, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN, Mar. 8, 1866, at 2.
121. Id.
122. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BLACK STUDIES 120 (Molefi Kete Asante & Ama
Mazama eds., 2005). As one source describes them: ―[T]he Black Codes enacted
during the presidency of Andrew Johnson prevented blacks from sitting on
juries, prohibited blacks from voting, limited blacks‘ testimony against whites,
denied blacks the right to work in certain occupations, and legislated against
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In the 1860s, infamous ―black codes‖ were being repealed in
northern states,123 yet persisted—or were being enacted and
embraced with great fervor—in southern states in the post-Civil
War period, thus necessitating federal legislation to quash their
overt discriminatory animus.124 As the New York Times described
blacks carrying weapons.‖ Id.; see also id. (―[I]n April of 1866, President Johnson
vetoed the civil rights bill, telling Governor Thomas C. Fletcher of Missouri,
‗This is a country for white men, and by God, as long as I am President, it shall
be a government for white men.‘‖); JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE:
THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW 42 (2002) (noting that southern states in the postCivil War period ―intended to return to virtually the same social relationship
between whites and now-freed blacks as that which had existed before the
Confederacy‘s defeat‖ and that, ―[t]o achieve it, the Black Codes were
deliberately designed to be restrictive and harsh in their application‖).
123. See The Black Code of Illinois, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1865, at 2
(―It is a matter of profound satisfaction that Illinois has repealed the infamous
black code, which for so many years has disgraced its statute book, and
dishonored its claim to freedom.‖); see also A Black Code Annulled, ST. CLOUD
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 28, 1865, at 2:
We are glad to learn via Memphis that by orders from Washington to
Gen. Thomas, commanding the department which includes the State
of Mississippi, the latter officer is instructed to disregard the ―Black
Code‖ of Mississippi, as passed by the late Legislature, under the title
of ―An Act to confer civil rights upon freedmen.‖
124. Who Are the Murderers?, LIBERATOR, June 23, 1865, at 1 (―When the
Federal Government first ordered the enlistment of colored soldiers, he who is
now a fugitive [Jefferson Davis] issued a proclamation announcing that the
captured officers of negro troops would be tried by the murderous Black Codes of
the Slave States.‖); Misrepresentation, NORFOLK POST, July 29, 1865, at 2 (―They
. . . proceeded to put in force the obsolete black code of Virginia, oppressive to
the negro race.‖); South Carolina Slave Code, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, Nov. 16,
1865, at 2:
The Black Code of South Carolina, to which we have referred, which
has been framed by a commission for the present legislature of that
State, is the most infamous scheme yet begotten of Southern
ingenuity. It is a special code for the freed blacks, thus making them
a degraded caste, which concedes them nothing and exacts everything
from them.
Tennessee Black Code, DAILY OHIO STATESMAN, May 18, 1865, at 2:
A bill has passed the Lower House of the Tennessee Legislature to
enact a black code, which looks very much like a measure to retain
slavery under another name, or as if it was designed to vent the spite
of the masters against the freedmen. . . . [I]n most of the regulations
of society it makes a separate caste of the free blacks, providing
various exclusions and disabilities, and a different criminal code for
their punishment.
Political News and Gossip, WHEELING INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 19, 1865, at 1 (noting
that a general from South Carolina, then a candidate for Congress, demanded
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those discriminatory laws: ―The black codes adopted by the
unreconstructed Southern Legislatures, after the close of the war,
were adopted because they would give the whites the same power
over the blacks which slavery had secured for them hitherto.‖125
The codes were designed to ensure a subservient and stable labor
force by, for example, imposing penalties on black laborers who
―jumped‖ their labor contracts. Those contracts usually
committed newly emancipated slaves to one-year work
commitments, and they generally provided for very low wages. As
one history puts it:
These oppressive laws mocked the ideal of freedom, so recently
purchased by buckets of blood. The Black Codes imposed
terrible burdens on the unfettered blacks, struggling against
mistreatment and poverty to make their way as free people.
Thousands of impoverished former slaves slipped into virtual
peonage as sharecropper farmers, as did many landless
whites.126

The authority of Congress to pass the Civil Rights Acts of
1866, however, was questioned by many people, southerners and
northerners alike. For example, one Pennsylvania newspaper
―the enactment of a new and most stringent black code‖ to ―‗keep the freedmen
in subjection‘‖).
125. Status of the Southern Freedmen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1868, at 4.
126. 2 DAVID M. KENNEDY, LIZABETH COHEN & MEL PIEHL, THE BRIEF
AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 353 (9th ed. 2017). The
horrendous treatment of blacks in the Reconstruction Era is well documented.
See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Making Race Matter in Death Matters, in
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE, supra note 39, at 57–58:
During Reconstruction, once the era of slavery had formally ended,
both black and white Southerners attempted to discern their roles in
the new social system. While the South was under federal control,
black men won the right to vote and some had been elected to
Congress. Many whites resented the newfound rights of the freedmen
and reacted violently, continuing in the trend devaluing black life
that had begun during slavery. Federal workers stationed in the
South observed these intentional killings that occurred over slight
―offenses‖ by blacks. One black man was killed in 1866 for failing to
take off his hat in the presence of a white man. Another report
describes a black soldier killed at the hands of an identified (and
unpunished) white man; fellow citizens justified the murder,
describing the victim as ―a damned nigger.‖ To solidify their
continued domination, white Southerners enacted Black Codes to
allow them to maintain some of the control of blacks they had during
slavery.
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observed that ―the second section‖ of the bill ―exposes State
judges and other officers to fine and imprisonment for construing
or enforcing any law or regulation which may be held to conflict
with the provisions of the act.‖ ―The idea of punishing a judge by
a criminal prosecution for a mis-judgment or wrong judgment
upon a question of law,‖ that newspaper editorialized, ―is
monstrous.‖ ―But the most important question which is to be
examined,‖ that paper stressed, ―is the question of power in
Congress, under the Constitution, to enact the bill into a law, and
particularly to enact the first section.‖ ―From whence is derived
the authority to enact this section?‖ the paper queried.127 Black
codes were seen as vestiges of slavery,128 but there was
disagreement as to whether there needed to be a new
constitutional amendment to wipe out such oppressive codes
following
the
Thirteenth
Amendment‘s
adoption
and
ratification.129
That Pennsylvania newspaper, in mulling over its rhetorical
question about congressional authority, continued: ―It cannot be
from the naturalization clause of the Constitution.‖ ―The
argument then,‖ the paper added, ―must turn upon the

127. See The Civil Rights Bill, COLUMBIAN, May 12, 1866, at 2.
128. Senator Wilson on Negro Suffrage, CLEVELAND DAILY LEADER, July 13,
1865, at 2 (―I want the South to understand that their black code and their black
laws, and all they have done to hold men in slavery, were abolished for ever
with slavery itself . . . .‖); Yale College, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1865, at 1 (―[W]e
owe it to the memory of our dead to extirpate and sweep away every vestige of
slavery . . . . The whole black code must go.‖).
129. In an hour and a half speech, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner
emphasized: ―Slavery has been abolished in name; but that is all.‖ ―The work of
liberation,‖ he stressed, ―is not yet completed.‖ ―Nor can it be completed,‖ he
observed, ―until the equal rights of every person, once claimed as a slave, are
placed under the safeguard of irreversible guarantees.‖ ―It is not enough to
strike down the master; you must also lift up the slave,‖ he said, adding: ―It is
not enough to declare that slavery is abolished. The whole black code, which is
the supplement of slavery, must give place to that equality before the law which
is the very essence of liberty.‖ The Massachusetts Republican Convention, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1865, at 1; accord Speech of Hon. Charles Sumner, at the
Republican State Convention, in Worcester, Sept. 14, 1865, LIBERATOR, Sept. 22,
1865, at 1 (―The whole Black Code, which is the supplement of Slavery, must
give place to that Equality before the law which is the very essence of Liberty.‖).
In 1856, Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina—a fierce proponent of
slavery—had infamously beaten Sumner in the U.S. Senate chamber. STEPHEN
PULEO, THE CANING: THE ASSAULT THAT DROVE AMERICA TO CIVIL WAR (2012).
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amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery.‖ As the
newspaper argued as regards the Thirteenth Amendment:
By that amendment Congress was authorized to enforce
emancipation ‗by appropriate legislation.‘ Now appropriate
legislation must mean here such laws as are necessary to
execute and maintain the abolition of slavery decreed by the
previous clause of the amendment. The relation of master and
slave was to be broken, and never to be renewed. Whatever is
necessary to this end, and appropriate to its accomplishment,
Congress may do in its legislative capacity; but it can do
nothing else by virtue of this power. Testing the above section
by this rule, it stands unsupported by any arguments or
reason which can be accepted by a just and reasonable mind.

―The power to enforce the abolition of slavery of negroes,‖ the
paper continued, ―does not then extend to endowing them with all
the privileges of citizenship in a State, or to conferring upon them
all such civil or political rights as Congress may think useful or
convenient to them.‖ The paper thus called the Civil Rights Bill of
1866 ―both injudicious and unconstitutional; a measure not to be
praised, but condemned.‖130
To ward off legal challenges to the law‘s constitutionality,
Congress incorporated its key features in the first section of the
U.S. Constitution‘s Fourteenth Amendment, which got ratified in
1868.131 That section of the Fourteenth Amendment—intended to
130. The Civil Rights Bill, COLUMBIAN, May 12, 1866, at 2.
131. CHICAGO TRIB., May 19, 1968, at 7; see also David E. Bernstein, The
Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by
African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 788 (1998) (―Congress passed the
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act.‖). After ―black codes,‖ in effect, ―substantially restored slavery,‖ Americans
moved to bar racial discrimination and, eventually, toward universal suffrage
for blacks. A Retrospect, MARSHALL COUNTY REPUBLICAN, Jan. 2, 1868, at 1 (―Not
until the evils resulting from the plan began to develop, in black codes that
substantially restored slavery, did the people and politicians begin to move
forward to universal suffrage.‖); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1121 (1997):
When southern states adopted Black Codes constricting land
ownership and employment of freedmen in such a way as to tie the
emancipated slaves to their former owners, Congress passed the 1866
Civil Rights Act . . . . Because there was dispute about whether the
Thirteenth Amendment‘s prohibition of slavery vested Congress with
the power to define and protect civil rights in this fashion, Congress
began
work
on
the
drafting
and
ratification
of
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constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866132—began: ―All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside.‖ Section 1 then continued: ―No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.‖133 Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment then gave the U.S. Congress (as had the Thirteenth
Amendment) express implementing authority, reading as follows:
―The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.‖134 Not only did the Civil
the Fourteenth Amendment, and soon thereafter re[e]nacted the
substance of the 1866 statute in the Civil Rights Act of 1870. When
similar disputes arose over scope of rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress vested the emancipated slaves
with the political right of voting through the Fifteenth Amendment.
132. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 957–58 (1995):
Any analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment must begin with its
statutory precursor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . . The bill was
passed pursuant to Congress‘s authority to enforce the provisions of
the Thirteenth Amendment, and was designed to counter the socalled ―Black Codes‖ passed by the Southern states, denying
fundamental civil rights to the freedmen. From its inception,
however, the 1866 Act was plagued with doubts as to its
constitutionality. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act for that
reason, and although his veto was overridden, constitutional concerns
were sufficiently serious that supporters of the Act set to work on a
constitutional amendment to cure them.
See also id. at 958:
The principal draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, was among those who
believed the principles of the 1866 Act to be desirable, but Congress‘s
power to be lacking. The principal purpose of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as virtually all students of the subject agree,
was to provide a firm constitutional basis for the 1866 Act and to
ensure that future Congresses would not be able to repeal it.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 5; see also Buckey v. County of Los
Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that ―a denial of equal
protection of the laws‖ was ―a wrong quite familiar to those in Congress who in
1866 enacted the first civil rights act and promulgated the Fourteenth
Amendment‖); Ray Sebastian Pantle, Blacker Than Death Row: How Current
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Rights Act of 1866 demand ―like punishments, pains and
penalties,‖ but so too did the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
implementing legislation, the 1870 Enforcement Act, which reenacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act.135
The Fourteenth Amendment was thus intended to equalize
punishments as between black and white offenders—something
that Professor Goldfarb and others point out has never been
achieved in the death penalty context despite all the efforts of the
courts to do so.136 As one West Virginia newspaper observed in
1879:

Equal Protection Analysis Fails Minorities Facing Capital Punishment, 35 CAP.
U. L. REV. 811, 813 (2007):
Those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment specifically wished to
overrule the laws passed after the Civil War, known as the Black
Codes, which legislators implemented to maintain white supremacy.
Many of these codes mandated more severe treatment for black
defendants
charged
with
a
crime.
Through
the Equal Protection Clause,
our
nation
―constitutionalize[d]‘
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, by guaranteeing that ‗inhabitants of
every race and color . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains
and penalties, and no other.‘‖
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14, Stat. 27 (1866)).
135. WILLIAM B. GLIDDEN, CONGRESS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
ENFORCING LIBERTY AND EQUALITY IN THE STATES 45 (2013). Section 16 of the
1870 Enforcement Act provided in part as follows: ―That all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.‖ An
Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to vote in the several
States of this Union, and for other Purposes, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 114 (May
31, 1870) (emphasis added). Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, also
known as the Civil Rights Act of 1870, provided: ―And be it further enacted, That
the act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and
furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred and
sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen hereof shall
be enforced according to the provisions of said act.‖ Id. § 18.
136. In their new book, Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker—a sister and
brother writing team—point to these damning statistics:
In modern-era Louisiana, killers of whites are six times more likely to
get a death sentence than killers of blacks, and fourteen times more
likely to be executed; black men who kill white women are thirty
times more likely to get a death sentence than black men who kill
other black men. No white person has been executed in Louisiana for
a crime against a black victim since 1752.
STEIKER & STEIKER, COURTING DEATH, supra note 5, at 110.
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We need not explain that the Fourteenth A[mendment] of the
Constitution of the United States was manifestly intended to
equalize and protect fully and fairly all the legal rights of
citizens of the United States, be they white or black. The
a[mendment] was not adopted to equalize and better protect
the rights of white citizens, but to prevent any State of the
Union from drawing a color or race line against any citizen of
the United States whereby his full and equal citizenship could
be impaired.137

In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court itself emphasized that ―[m]any
of the Members of the 39th Congress viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as ‗constitutionalizing‘ and expanding the
protections of the 1866 Act and viewed what became § 5 of the
Amendment as laying to rest doubts shared by both sides of the
aisle concerning the constitutionality of that measure.‖138
137. The Case of Taylor Strauder, INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 30, 1879, at 2; see
also Important Decision, NASHVILLE UNION & AM., Sept. 13, 1871, at 3 (―The civil
rights bill was . . . passed a short time before the fourteenth amendment
received the sanction of the people of the United States. In May, 1870, Congress
passed an act to carry into effect the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and
by section 18 reenacted the civil rights bill. 16 Stat. at L. 140.‖); FORT SCOTT
WEEKLY MONITOR, June 18, 1885, at 2:
Section 1,977 [of the U.S. Code provided:] ―All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
state and territory to make and inforce contracts, to sue, be parties to,
and give evidence to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment . . . .
138. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721–72 (1989)
(citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2465 (1866) (Rep. Thayer) (―As I
understand it, it is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States
the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law.‖); id. at 2498
(Rep. Broomall); id. at 2459 (Rep. Stevens); id. at 2461 (Rep. Finck); id. at 2467
(Rep. Boyer)); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948):
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Frequent references to the Civil
Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates on
the adoption of the Amendment. It is clear that in many significant
respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of the
same general congressional policy.
Martinsen v. Mullaney, 85 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. Alaska Terr. 1949) (―The rights
protected in the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 were incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment which was adopted in 1868 in order to remove doubts
as to the constitutionality of the Act . . . .‖); Ryan D. Walters, The Thirteenth
Amendment “Exception” to the State Action Doctrine: An Originalist
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The legislative debate over the Fourteenth Amendment is
revealing, with many legal scholars explicitly noting how the
Fourteenth Amendment ―constitutionalized‖ the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.139 At the time, Republican Congressman Martin Russell
Thayer of Pennsylvania—a respected lawyer140—asserted that
the amendment ―incorporat[ed] in the Constitution of the United
States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become
a law . . . in order . . . that that provision so necessary for the
equal administration of the law, so just in its operation, so
necessary for the protection of the fundamental rights of
citizenship, shall be forever incorporated in the Constitution of

Reappraisal, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 283, 323 (2013):
The continuing doubts about Congress‘s power under the Thirteenth
Amendment to enact the Civil Rights Act led to the drafting
of Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution that had two purposes:
to authorize, without doubt, Congress‘s authority to pass
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and further, to prevent its repeal by a
future Congress by embedding its terms into the Constitution itself.
139. See Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving
v. Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1393, 1414 (2012) (―We know at a bare
minimum that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.‖); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death:
An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide
Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 111 (1984):
The language of the fourteenth amendment itself, prohibiting the
denial of ‗equal protection of the law,‘ speaks, if anything, more
clearly of victims than of defendants. The sponsors of the fourteenth
amendment unquestionably intended this language to prohibit
unequal punishments for defendants of different races—indeed one of
their major aims was to ‗constitutionalize‘ the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 . . . .
Stan Robin Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection: Constitutional
Problems, Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1992):
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit
unequal punishments for defendants of all races. As the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly illuminates, one of their
main goals was to ―constitutionalize‖ the provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to embrace the requirement that in every
state ―inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and no other.‖
(quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866)).
140. 2 THE PROGRESSIVE MEN OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 786–
87 (1900).
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the United States.‖141 In No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, scholar Michael Kent Curtis
observes of the post-Civil War legislative debate: ―Several
congressmen observed that the amendment would eliminate any
question about the power of Congress to pass the Civil Rights bill.
Others considered the amendment a reiteration of the Civil
Rights bill.‖142 In a speech delivered on August 7, 1866, Speaker
of the House Schuyler Colfax made this observation:
We passed a bill on the ninth of April last year, over the
President‘s veto, known as the Civil Rights Bill, that
specifically and directly declares what the rights of a citizen of
the United States are—that they may make and enforce
contracts, sue and be parties, give evidence, purchase, lease,
and sell property, and be subject to like punishments. That is
the last law upon the subject.‖143

The words of Republican Senator Jacob Howard of
Michigan—a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction—
are especially revealing. ―I look upon the first section, taken in
connection with the fifth, as very important,‖ Senator Howard
said in introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866. ―It will,
if adopted by the States,‖ Howard pointed out, ―forever disable
every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those
fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the
United States, and to all persons within their jurisdiction.‖ As
Senator Howard, addressing the presiding officer, told his fellow
lawmakers: ―It establishes equality before the law, and it gives to
the humblest, the poorest, and the most despised of the race the
same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to
the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty. That,
sir, is republican government, as I understand it, and the only
one which can claim the praise of a just Government.‖ In
concluding, Howard made this plea: ―Without a principle of equal
justice to all men and equal protection under the shield of the

141. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 86 (1986).
142. Id.
143. CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 46
(2015).
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law, there is no republican government and none that is really
worth maintaining.‖144
The historical context is critical to understanding the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s purpose. Southern ―Black Codes‖ were
notorious for punishing African Americans more harshly than
whites, and southern intransigence was palpable. As The
Liberator, the anti-slavery Boston newspaper, put it in November
1865:
We are constantly hearing of the punishment of negroes in
various States, under the old black code, or the introduction of
new sets of laws on a basis similar to that, marking out the
blacks as the subjects of special legislation, defining acts as
criminal in them which are freely allowed to others, allotting
heavier punishments to them for the same offence, denying
them equal opportunities for education and employment, and
in various ways undertaking to restrict them to a position of
acknowledged inferiority.145

Just one month after the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
ratification, The Pittsburgh Commercial took note of a speech by
a prominent Pittsburgh attorney, Robert B. Carnahan, the local
U.S. District Attorney under Presidents Lincoln, Johnson and
Grant. ―Mr. Carnahan,‖ the paper observed, ―referred to the
‗black‘ codes of the South adopted in 1865 and 1866‖ that
―demonstrated that the negro remained practically a slave until
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.‖ ―Acts were made
crimes as respected the negro which were not crimes as respected
the white man,‖ it was noted.146

144. Id. at 159.
145. Schemes and Opportunities, LIBERATOR, Nov. 17, 1865, at 2; see also
Black Codes, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 29, 1865, at 2:
At the commencement of the present effort to reconstruct the South
on the rebel basis alone, we predicted that the cloven foot would
appear when the State Legislatures should come to frame their
―Black Codes.‖ It matters not to the late rebels whether their
constitution reads ―slavery is abolished‖ or ―slavery is restored,‖ so
long as the masters are at liberty to govern the servants by their own
―Black Code.‖ . . . We lay down the fundamental proposition that the
whites of a State have no more right to frame Black Code of any kind
than to restore slavery in all its enormity. All laws made for blacks
must apply to whites and vice verso.
146. Steubenville, PITTSBURGH COMMERCIAL, Aug. 29, 1868, at 1.
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In some places, the abandonment of ―black codes‖ was
accompanied by an end to the use of whipping.147 But in other
places, the attempt to enforce ―black codes‖ or their equivalents
echoed with the reverberations of slavery, with southern
lawmakers seeking to resort to the lash through vagrancy laws.
For example, in early 1866, The Weekly Standard in Raleigh,
North Carolina, reported that while ―United States authorities‖
had ―disallowed‖ the Mississippi Legislature‘s ―Black Code,‖ a
vagrancy scheme called for an offender to receive ―thirty-nine
lashes on his or her bare back‖ or to receive a fifty dollar fine.148
Under that scheme, the judge also had the discretion to ―hire out
such vagrant for not exceeding six months, instead of committing
him to the jail or house of correction.‖149 As that newspaper noted
of the supposedly race-neutral scheme: ―This law made no
distinction between white vagrants and black ones. It is a
stringent and summary law, well calculated to meet the
exigencies of the times. There can be no question that severe
measures must be resorted to to put down the evil of laziness
among the negroes.‖150 Southern obstinacy made the need for
federal intervention—and the need for the U.S. Constitution‘s
Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection Clause—crystal
clear.151
147. See Letter from Rev. E. M. Wheelock, LIBERATOR, Mar. 3, 1865, at 2
(―[T]he mere presence of the army had strangled the infernal force of slavery,
and arrested the action of its black code . . . [t]he use of the whip, and all cruel
and unusual punishments, were forbidden.‖).
148. Alabama, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 3, 1866, at 4.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Negro Justice, PITTSBURGH DAILY POST, Mar. 21, 1868, at 3
(reprinting a story from a Mississippi newspaper about a case involving the
theft of a cow ―on a large plantation‖). According to the Pittsburgh Daily Post
story, the theft of the cow ―illustrates the negro‘s idea of justice and his own
views of the utility of the ‗black code.‘‖ Id. That story further reported that
where ―[o]ne negro stole a cow from another and was detected,‖ the tribunal‘s
judgment was that the culprit ―be taken thence to a convenient place, and there
staked out on the ground by hands and feet, and receive one hundred and fifty
stripes on his naked back, well laid on.‖ Id.
151. See House of Representatives, PITTSBURGH COMMERCIAL, Feb. 2, 1866, at
1 (―Mr. Donnelly concluded by giving abstracts of the black codes of the South,
showing that the freedman would be speedily re-enslaved if the government did
not interfere.‖); Telegraphic News, COURIER-J., Feb. 2, 1866, at 3 (discussing the
speech of ―Mr. Donnelly, of Minnesota‖); compare BURLINGTON WEEKLY FREE
PRESS, Apr. 6, 1866, at 1 (―What we want is the Black Code expunged from our
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The death penalty‘s inequitable use against blacks in the
nineteenth century was part and parcel of the ―black codes‖—and
very much in line with how slaves had been treated in the past.
In an ―Address of the Negroes to the Native Whites,‖ the ―colored
citizens‖ of Charleston, South Carolina, made this appeal to their
―FELLOW-CITIZENS‖:
[Y]ou derided the idea of granting us the right to vote; when
your Legislature met in 1865-66, you passed that infamous
Black Code which is a disgrace to civilization; in that you
denied us all rights in common with other people in the State;
you, by these acts, denied our children the school-house; you
imposed penalties on us, which were not imposed on white
men; there were crimes which, if committed by a white man,
he was imprisoned, but if committed by a black man, he was
hung.152

In September 1868, an article in the New York Times about
Georgia‘s ―old slave code,‖ specifically took note of the Fourteenth
Amendment‘s abrogation of statutes ―bearing on color.‖ That
article spoke of the denial to ―colored people‖ of ―equal protection
Southern statute books, and these people put upon the same platform as other
people, to work for whom they may elect to work, and to have the same rights in
our courts as white people have . . . .‖) with Constitutionality of the
Reconstruction Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1868, at 4:
The Southern revolutionists, while acknowledging their defeat, the
loss of their cause, and the death of slavery, by their black codes and
their rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment, distinctly refused the
guarantee insisted upon by the loyal people—insisted upon a majority
equal to that demanded by the continuation of the war in opposition
to the disgraceful peace-at-any-price platform of the Democratic Party
in 1864.
152. South Carolina: Address of the Negroes to the Native Whites, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1868, at 1; see also A Frank Abandonment, CHARLESTON
ADVOCATE, Nov. 21, 1868, at 3:
Mr. John Quincy Adams made a little speech at his home after his
return from his late Southern visit, in which he said that the exrebels said to him that ―they had frankly abandoned what they fought
for.‖ . . . . The first act of the same Legislatures [of the rebel States]
was to pass infamous black codes in which the whole spirit of slavery
was maintained, and under which orderly and tolerable society was
impossible. The black codes re-established all of slavery but the
name. The freedmen were made a pariah class; . . . the criminal laws
discriminated wickedly against them; the black code virtually
compelled them to be vagrants, and the vagrant laws sold them to
service. (from Harper‟s Weekly).
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in the administration of the laws,‖ with the article emphasizing
that ―black codes were enacted as cruel, as unjust, and in all
respects as infamous as those which disgraced the days before the
war.‖ It was not until ―the authority of Congress was exerted,‖
the article observed, ―that an end was put to black codes and the
outrages perpetrated under them.‖153
The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that predate
McCleskey also make clear the Fourteenth Amendment‘s purpose
to end racial discrimination and to equalize punishments. In its
1883 decision in United States v. Harris,154 the Supreme Court
declared:
Congress has, by virtue of this amendment, enacted that all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every state and territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment . . . .155

In its 1948 decision in Hurd v. Hodge,156 the Court emphasized of
the 39th Congress, the one that debated the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Indeed, as the legislative debates reveal, one of the primary
purposes of many members of Congress in supporting the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the
guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of
the land. Others supported the adoption of the Amendment in
order to eliminate doubt as to the constitutional validity of the
Civil Rights Act as applied to the States.‖157
153. Promises and Performances, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1868, at 4.
154. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
155. Id. at 640.
156. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
157. Id. at 32–33:
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was
later adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first
session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Frequent references to the Civil
Rights Act are to be found in the record of the legislative debates on
the adoption of the Amendment. It is clear that in many significant
respects the statute and the Amendment were expressions of the
same general congressional policy.
See also id. at 33:
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And in its 1964 decision in McLaughlin v. State of Florida,158 the
Supreme Court made a similar statement as regards the origins
of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause.159
An 1880 U.S. Supreme Court decision also makes the point.
In that case, Strauder v. West Virginia,160 the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state from
The close relationship between § 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment was given specific recognition by this Court
in Buchanan v. Warley, [245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917).] There, the Court
observed that, not only through the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also by virtue of the ‗statutes enacted in furtherance
of its purpose,‘ including the provisions here considered, a colored
man is granted the right to acquire property free from interference by
discriminatory state legislation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was inspired in part by unequal punishments in
the South and the urgent need to remedy that disparity. See Delenda est
Carthago—The Only Remedy for Southern Tyranny,‖ EVENING TELEGRAPH , Jan.
5, 1866, at 4:
At the very moment that the fact of the passage of this black code is
received, comes the intelligence that Senator TRUMBULL will move a
bill in the Senate, [o]ne object of which is to enlarge the powers of the
Freedman‘s Bureau, and the other to protect all persons in the United
States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication.
The first provides that in insurrectionary districts where, by State
law or custom, any of the civil rights belonging to white persons are
denied to negroes or mulattoes, or where they are subjected to
different punishment than is prescribed for whites, the officers and
agents of the Freedmen‘s Bureau shall, so long as such discrimination
continues, have jurisdiction of all such cases affecting such negroes or
mulattoes. It also provides for punishing by fine and imprisonment,
through the courts of the Freedman‘s Bureau, any person who shall
subject a negro or mulatto, in consequence of his race or color, to any
other or different punishment than is prescribed for white persons, or
shall deny any civil rights which belong to the white race.
158. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
159. Id. at 192:
We deal here with a racial classification embodied in a criminal
statute. In this context, where the power of the State weighs most
heavily upon the individual or the group, we must be especially
sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause which, as
reflected in congressional enactments dating from 1870, were
intended to secure ―the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property‖ and to subject
all persons ―to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.‖
(citation omitted).
160. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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denying ―colored‖ citizens the right to participate in the
administration of the laws as jurors. The language of that
landmark decision, laden with racism but finding West Virginia‘s
exclusion of blacks from juries to violate the Equal Protection
Clause, shows how black citizens were viewed in the post-Civil
War era by a wide swath of society. In writing about the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court made this late
nineteenth-century observation: ―This is one of a series of
constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely,
securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through
many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights
that the superior race enjoy.‖161 When the Fourteenth
Amendment was ―incorporated into the Constitution,‖ the Court
noted,
it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that
those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject
race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be
looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State
laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the
distinctions that had before existed.162

As the Supreme Court further emphasized in Strauder:
Discriminations against them had been habitual. It was well
known that in some States laws making such discriminations
then existed, and others might well be expected. The colored
race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition
was unfitted to command the respect of those who had
superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere
children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise
161. Id. at 306.
162. Id.; see also THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1721 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012):
The 1880 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Strauder v. West Virginia
looked to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate a West Virginia policy excluding individuals from serving
on juries because of their race. The policy was carried out in a statute
limiting jury service to ―all white male persons.‖ The case was argued
before the Supreme Court on October 21, 1879. It was decided on
March 1, 1880. The decision struck down jury exclusion practices
common among southern states, which sought to empanel white-only
juries despite the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that made
it a crime to violate the principle that all citizens had a right to serve
on both state and federal juries.
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government extends to those who are unable to protect
themselves. They especially needed protection against
unfriendly action in the States where they were resident. 163

―It was in view of these considerations,‖ the Court stressed, ―the
Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted.‖ ―It was
designed,‖ the Court pointed out, ―to assure to the colored race
the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are
enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection
of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should
be denied by the States.‖164 The Strauder ruling was the first
time in American history that the Supreme Court recognized the
right of blacks to participate in the jury system.165
In its 1966 decision in Baines v. City of Danville, Virginia,166
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—in speaking of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment—emphasized its importance this way:
Both supporters and opponents of the measure understood
that the civil rights granted in section 1 were to be given the
broadest possible scope, and it was only to dispel any doubts
concerning the authority of Congress to grant such sweeping
rights to the Negro that the Fourteenth Amendment was
proposed and submitted to the states by the same Congress
that enacted section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. 167

―The enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, in language
closely paralleling section 1 of the 1866 statute,‖ the Fourth
Circuit wrote, ―legitimated beyond question Congress‘ attempt to
protect the type of rights granted in the statute, and there is no
reason to think that the rights contemplated by section 1 are of
less breadth than those contemplated by the Equal Protection
Clause.‖168 The Equal Protection Clause, American courts have
163. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306.
164. Id.
165. HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND THE
JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 88 (1993).
166. 357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1966).
167. Id. at 775.
168. Id.; see also id. at 775–76 (―Contemporary legislators and the Supreme
Court have consistently read the two provisions together.‖); Martinsen v.
Mullaney, 85 F. Supp. 76, 79 (Alaska Terr. Dist. Ct. 1949) (―The rights protected
in the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment which was adopted in 1868 in order to remove doubts as to the
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held, ―requires that all persons who are similarly situated should
be treated alike.‖169
constitutionality of the Act.‖); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
675 (1898):
The same congress, shortly afterwards, evidently thinking it unwise,
and perhaps unsafe, to leave so important a declaration of rights to
depend upon an ordinary act of legislation, which might be repealed
by any subsequent congress, framed the fourteenth amendment of the
constitution, and on June 16, 1866, by joint resolution, proposed it to
the legislatures of the several states; and on July 28, 1868, the
secretary of state issued a proclamation showing it to have been
ratified by the legislatures of the requisite number of states.
(citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (Apr. 9, 1866); 14 Stat. 358; 15 Stat.
708); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 395 (1871) (―This act took effect on the 9th
day of April, 1866, which was prior to the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment. This amendment seems to have been mainly copied from, or
modelled after the section above quoted from the civil rights bill.‖) (citing Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
169. Jackson v. California, No. 1:13-cv-01055-LJO-SA, 2015 WL 2414938 at
*11 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2015) (citations omitted); see also State v. Maniscalco,
Nos. 98-S-482-485, 98-S-591-594, 2001 WL 34012424 at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. May
14, 2001) (―‗The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the
State action in question treats similarly situated persons differently.‘‖) (citation
omitted); H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, No. 5:03-CV-278-BO, 2007 WL 7766702
at *5 n.6 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (―The prohibition of discrimination contained
in Section 1981 is co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause.‖) (citation
omitted); Jones v. State Bd. of Ed. of and for State of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp.
190, 203 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (―Equal protection of the law guarantees against
invidious discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law
may not lay an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the
same quality of offense.‖); cf. Pruitt v. Howard County Sheriff‘s Department, 623
A.2d 696, 703–704 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (―Appellants cannot succeed on
their equal protection claim unless they can show that other, similarly situated
individuals did not receive the same treatment, i.e., they were not subject to like
punishment for like behavior.‖); People v. Finley, 94 P. 248, 249 (Cal. 1908) (―we
cannot perceive that appellant was denied the equal protection of the laws, for
every other person in like cases with him, and convicted as he has been, would
be subjected to like punishment‖); In re Boggs, 45 F. 475, 475–76 (Cir. Ct., D.
Ky. 1891):
It is also contended that this statute is class legislation, as it
punishes ex-convicts more severely for the same offenses than it does
those not theretofore convicted of a felony, and is within the
prohibition of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution,
which declares no state shall ―deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws.‖ . . . . This statu[t]e does not deny the petitioner the
equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of this amendment.
Every other person convicted as he has been would be subject to like
punishment as that he has received. This is all the amendment
means.
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In the mid-nineteenth century, the right to be free from
―cruel and unusual punishments‖ was—among many other
rights—often described as one of the ―privileges and immunities‖
of citizenship.170 As adopted, the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that ―[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States‖ and that no state shall ―deprive‖ any person of
―life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.‖171 When, in
1866, Representative John Bingham of Ohio referred to privileges
and immunities as ―the inborn rights of every person,‖ he cited
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments as an example. Bingham—a drafter of the
Fourteenth Amendment—did not support the Civil Rights Act of
1866 because of his belief that Congress lacked constitutional
authority, but on the subject of the privileges and immunities of
U.S. citizens, he passionately observed: ―[M]any instances of
State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State
legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied
privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national
Government furnished, and could furnish by law no remedy
whatsoever.‖ ―Contrary to the express letter of your
Constitution,‖ Bingham emphasized, ―‗cruel and unusual
punishment‘ have been inflicted under State laws within this
Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred
duty done, for which and against which the Government of the
United States had provided no remedy and could provide
none.‖172
In that era, a distinction was made between natural rights
and political rights. In an 1859 debate about the meaning of due
process, Bingham had spoken of ―natural or inherent rights‖ as
those that ―belong to all men irrespective of all conventional
regulations‖ and as ―sacred rights which are as universal and
170. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 204; see also ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, May 20, 1874, at 5 (―The following are most if not all the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States: The right to the writ
of habeas corpus; . . . from excessive bail; from excessive fines; from cruel and
unusual punishment; from the condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment . . . .‖)
171. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
172. LASH, supra note 114, at 151–52.
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indestructible as the human race.‖ By contrast, Bingham viewed
―political rights‖ as ―conventional not natural; limited, not
universal.‖ Yet, Bingham asserted then that ―[a]ll free persons,
then, born and domiciled in any State of the Union, are citizens of
the United States; and, although not equal in respect of political
rights, are equal in respect of natural rights.‖173 In the debate
over the Fourteenth Amendment itself, Congressman Frederick
E. Woodbridge described its purpose as empowering Congress to
pass ―those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States
the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship‖ and
―those privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him
under the Constitution of the United States.‖174
The concept of ―privileges and immunities‖ had long been
associated with ―fundamental‖ rights, those ―which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments.‖ James Madison had
described the freedom of the press and the right of conscience as
the ―choicest privileges of the people‖ and as ―invaluable
privileges.‖175 And for nineteenth-century abolitionists, the rights
set forth in the first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution
were expressly viewed as falling within the scope of ―privileges
and immunities.‖ Likewise, in 1866, Republican Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan spoke of ―the character of the privileges and
immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution.‖176
173. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT‘S CONSTITUTION:
INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY 56–61 (1993).

AN INQUIRY

174. FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME COURT‘S RETREAT FROM
RECONSTRUCTION: A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 32 (2000);
see also id.:
The amendment in its final version was given a broad interpretation
by Senator Andrew J. Rogers, a Democratic opponent of the
amendment who tried to alarm his colleagues by defining ―all the
rights we have under the laws of the country‖ as ―privileges and
immunities.‖ The Privileges and Immunities Clause would ―prevent
any State from refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced
under this term of privileges and immunities,‖ including the rights to
vote, marry, contract, be a juror, or be a judge or president.
175. SLAVERY AND THE LAW 192 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2002).
176. U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2 (―The citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.‖); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 88 (1986) (quoting Senator Howard).
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To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—
for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire
extent and precise nature—to these should be added the
personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of
speech and of the press; . . . and also the right to be secure
against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual
punishments.177

In an 1849 description of the ―privileges‖ and ―immunities‖ of
U.S. citizens, abolitionist Joel Tiffany had also listed among them
―the right to be exempt from excessive bail, or fines, &c., from
cruel and unusual punishments.‖ ―The paradigmatic example of
protected privileges or immunities,‖ constitutional law scholar
Kurt Lash has written, ―would be those rights listed in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution.‖178
In his speech introducing the Fourteenth Amendment,
Senator Jacob Howard emphasized that it ―abolishes all class
legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to the
other.‖179 As Senator Howard observed:
It prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which
the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black man in
his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which
it throws over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President,
that we extend to the black man, I had almost called it the
poor privilege of the equal protection of the law? 180

After asking that rhetorical question, Howard posed yet another:
Ought not the time to be now passed when one measure of
justice is to be meted out to a member of one caste while
another and a different measure is meted out to the member of
another caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United
States, both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the
burdens of the same Government, and both equally
responsible to justice and to God for the deeds done in the
body?181

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 176, at 88.
LASH, supra note 114, at 76–77, 157, 289.
GREEN, supra note 143, at 158–59.
Id.
Id.
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The Fourteenth Amendment played a transformative role in
shaping America‘s criminal law. ―For almost a century after the
beginning of the United States,‖ one source notes, various
provisions of the Bill of Rights ―applied only to actions by the
federal government.‖ But as that criminology text emphasizes:
―The Fourteenth Amendment, passed in 1868 after the Civil War,
began to change this legal thinking. Designed to protect the
rights of the newly freed slaves, this amendment declared that no
state could deprive anyone of ‗life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.‘‖182 In accordance with that
―spacious language,‖ the U.S. Supreme Court stressed in Duncan
v. Louisiana,183 ―many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected
against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.‖184 As the Court held in that specific case in the late
1960s:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal
court—would come within the Sixth Amendment‘s
guarantee.185

IV. The Geography of Arbitrariness and Discrimination: The
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Implications of the Death
Penalty‟s Inequality
In modern constitutional litigation, the Eighth Amendment‘s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,186 made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,187 still plays a central
182. STEVEN E. BARKAN & GEORGE J. BRYJAK, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 135 (2d ed. 2011).
183. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
184. Id. at 148.
185. Id. at 149.
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖).
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (―No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
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role in criminal cases. The Eighth Amendment has already been
read to bar non-lethal corporal punishments—punishments that
have long been abandoned in the American penal system.188 In
Weems v. United States,189 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
corporal punishment known as cadena temporal that was
imposed in the Philippine Islands.190 That punishment consisted
of more than a decade of ―hard and painful labor,‖ with prisoners
required to ―always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the
wrists.‖191 In Hope v. Pelzer,192 the Supreme Court held that
Alabama prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by
handcuffing a shirtless inmate to a hitching post for seven hours,
leading to the prisoner‘s prolonged thirst, heat exposure and
sunburning.193 ―[T]he Eighth Amendment violation,‖ the Court
ruled of that inmate‘s legal claim, ―is obvious.‖194 And in Jackson
v. Bishop,195 the late Justice Harry Blackmun—then writing for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—held in 1968
that whipping Arkansas prisoners to discipline them constituted
an Eighth Amendment violation.196 ―Corporal punishment,‖

States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.‖); see also Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The
DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L. REV. 101, 128
(2013) (―Before the Fourteenth Amendment, African-Americans could not be
regarded as citizens, whether slave or free. . . . [T]he Supreme Court itself
determined in Dred Scott v. Sanford that even when free, black Americans could
not be considered citizens.‖) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 430
(1856)); GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 171
(2013) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause and noting that ―[t]his is the first
time in the Constitution that the word ‗equal‘ is used to apply to human
beings‖).
188. See John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUDIES
297, 430–34 (2013) (explaining the abandonment of non-lethal corporal
punishments in the U.S. penal system).
189. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
190. Id. at 364.
191. Id.
192. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
193. Id. at 734–35.
194. Id. at 738.
195. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
196. Id. at 579.
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Blackmun wrote, ―is degrading to the punisher and to the
punished alike.‖197
In her essay, ―Matters of Strata,‖ Professor Goldfarb writes
that ―race, gender, and class structures‖ raise the prospect of
―inequality and unfairness in the selection of defendants for
death.‖198 In the context of taking on death sentences, those lethal
punishments, she notes that the Eighth Amendment‘s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits arbitrary199 and
discriminatory punishments.200 She also observes that ideologies
of race, gender and class ―create a complex hierarchy that
separates the classes of those who decide others‘ fate from those
whose fates are decided.‖201 In fact, death penalty adjudications
are still tied up tightly with discrimination because the U.S
Supreme Court still allows ―death-qualified‖ juries.202 That line of
197. Id. at 580.
198. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3.
199. See id. at 3–4. The U.S. Supreme Court has long expressed concerns
about arbitrariness in capital sentencing. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541
(1987) (―The Constitution . . . requires that death penalty statutes be structured
so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and
unpredictable fashion.‖).
200. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 3–4. In striking down Connecticut‘s
death penalty as unconstitutional in 2015, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
put it this way:
It goes without saying, moreover, that the eighth amendment is
offended not only by the random or arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty, but also by the greater evils of racial discrimination and
other forms of pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed.
The eighth amendment, then, requires that any capital sentencing
scheme determine which defendants will be eligible for the death
penalty on the basis of legitimate, rational, nondiscriminatory factors.
State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 19 (Conn. 2015) (citations omitted).
201. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 6.
202. See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM 106 (2005) (―Death qualification significantly skews the
composition of the jury panel in ways that make it less balanced and fair, and
the process itself has a biasing effect on the jurors who pass through it.‖); id. at
106–07 (―[A] process that selects eligible jurors on the basis of death penalty
support will exclude disproportionately greater numbers of women and
blacks . . . because blacks are already underrepresented on the jury lists in
many parts of the country, death qualification may act to compound a
preexisting problem.‖); id. at 121 (―By requiring the attorneys and judge to dwell
on penalty at the very start of the trial, the death-qualification process implies a
heightened level of belief in the guilt of the defendant on the part of these major
trial participants.‖).
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cases, which traces back to the Supreme Court‘s 1968 decision in
Witherspoon v. Illinois,203 has the highly disturbing, perverse
effect of systematically excluding a disproportionate number of
minorities, women, Catholics, young people, and other groups
from sitting in judgment in capital cases.204
In southern ―Death Belt‖ states, judicial factfinders—be they
judges or capital juries stripped of large numbers of
minorities205—have been, and still are, subject to enormous
political pressure206 and what Professor Goldfarb calls the
203. 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see also SCOTT VOLLUM, ROLANDO V. DEL CARMEN,
DURANT FRANTZEN, CLAUDIA SAN MIGUEL & KELLY CHEESEMAN, THE DEATH
PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, COMMENTARIES, AND CASE BRIEFS 139 (2014).
204. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 20–23 (explaining that minorities,
including African-Americans, are underrepresented on juries in capital trials
because of jury selection practices and the use by prosecutors of peremptory
challenges to strike prospective African-American jurors); Baxter Oliphant,
Support for Death Penalty Lowest in More Than Four Decades, PEW RES.CTR.
(Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/29/support-fordeath-penalty-lowest-in-more-than-four-decades/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016)
(examining surveys which show that women and minorities view the death
penalty less favorably than white men) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
205. Only in recent years has the bench and bar become more diverse. See,
e.g., DAVID W. NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW,
COURTS, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (7th ed. 2016):
The United States is experiencing a revolutionary change in
composition of the bench. The dominant profile of judges as white
male Protestants has begun to change, but, to some, change has not
come fast enough. Women and racial minorities historically have
faced tremendous obstacles to becoming lawyers and judges. . . . Until
the twentieth century, the number of women judges in America was
so small it could be counted on one hand. . . . Today, an estimated 27
percent of the American bench is staffed by women lawyers.
The book goes on to note that—per the American Bar Association—only about
four percent of all state court judges are African American. Id.
206. State court judges in southern states, where the death penalty is more
popular than it is elsewhere in the country, are subject to elections and electoral
politics and, thus, political pressure. A report of the Brennan Center for Justice
at New York University School of Law, see KATE BERRY, HOW JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL CASES 7 (2015), notes:
[O]ne study found that trial judges in Alabama—who have a uniquely
powerful role in determining death sentences due to the state‘s
system of judicial override, by which a judge can override a jury‘s
sentence in a capital case—are more likely to impose death over jury
verdicts of life imprisonment during election years.
See also id. at 11 (―[S]tates with appointed justices reversed death penalty
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―[r]acial dynamics‖ of ―states of the old Confederacy.‖207 The
―Death Belt‖—as Professor Charles Ogletree has explained—
includes the nine southern states that account for the vast
number of executions carried out since 1976. Those states:
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia.208 The use of
highly discretionary ―peremptory‖ challenges injects still more
racial bias into capital prosecutions, with the U.S. Supreme Court
in recent cases finding that prospective black jurors were in fact
systematically stricken on the basis of race.209 Though defense
lawyers are entitled to challenge prosecutors‘ peremptory strikes
under Batson v. Kentucky,210 it is often extremely difficult to
prove that prosecutors‘ actions were racially motivated. Only
occasionally, when ―smoking gun‖ evidence emerges, are racist
attitudes or race-based peremptory strikes exposed and
censured.211
sentences at the highest rate—26 percent. States with judicial elections had
substantially lower reversal rates: 15 percent in states with appointed justices
who must face retention elections and 11 percent in states where justices are
elected in contested elections.‖).
207. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 25–28.
208. Matthew C. Heise, The Geography of Mercy: An Empirical Analysis of
Clemency for Death Row Inmates, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 10–11 (2013); see
also Andrew E. Taslitz, Daredevil and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
699, 706 (2004) (―The states of the Old Confederacy accounted for the vast
majority of lynchings in the twentieth century, while there was no such
vigilante system at work in the American Northeast.‖); Hugo Adam Bedau,
Causes and Consequences of Wrongful Convictions: An Essay-Review, 86
JUDICATURE 115, 118 (2002) (―[J]ust as the paradigm lynchings in American
history were carried out by white mobs on helpless black men as a populist
method of ruthless social control, so the death penalty is to a troubling extent a
socially approved practice of white-on-black violence, especially where the
crimes involved are black-on-white.‖).
209. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016); Miller-El v. Dretke,
545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005).
210. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
211. Sadly, racial discrimination in jury selection is still a modern reality.
See, e.g., DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE: HOW OUR SEARCH FOR
SAFETY INVADES OUR LIBERTIES 123 (2012):
Methods of weaving race into the selection process were outlined by a
senior prosecutor in the Philadelphia district attorney‘s office, Jack
McMahon, in a training video for fellow prosecutors. ―In selecting
blacks, you don‘t want the real educated ones,‖ he declared. ―Avoid
selecting older black women when the defendant is a young black
man,‖ he advised. ―If you get, like, a white teacher teaching in a black
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In Foster v. Chatman,212 the U.S. Supreme Court recently
weighed in on an especially disturbing case where, at trial, the
prosecution invidiously used peremptory strikes against all four
black prospective jurors qualified to serve.213 In an opinion
written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court noted
that in the prosecution‘s jury venire list—one that listed ―B‖ for
―Blacks‖ in a legend in the upper right hand corner—the names
of the black prospective jurors were highlighted in bright
green.214 The Court further emphasized that, under one of the
names of black prospective jurors, Clayton Lundy—an
investigator who helped the prosecution during jury selection—
wrote: ―If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors,
[this one] might be okay.‖215 Prospective black jurors were
identified by ―B#1,‖ ―B#2,‖ and ―B#3,‖ and, on questionnaires,
juror responses about their race had been circled.216 After noting
that ―[t]he ‗Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective
juror for a discriminatory purpose,‘‖217 and that ―[t]he first five
names‖ on the prosecution‘s ―definite NO‘s‘ list‖ were black,218 the
Supreme Court observed that there was a ―persistent focus on
race in the prosecution‘s file.‖219 ―[W]e are left with the firm
conviction,‖ the Supreme Court concluded, that the prosecution‘s
peremptory strikes ―were ‗motivated in substantial part by
discriminatory intent.‘‖220
In the post-Furman era, American courts have routinely
rejected challenges to death sentences based on race, gender and

school that‘s sick of these guys maybe, that may be one you accept,‖
he said. ―The only way you‘re going to do your best is to get jurors
that are unfair.‖ The tape, made public as McMahon campaigned for
district attorney, contributed to his defeat.
212. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
213. Id. at 1742–43.
214. Id. at 1744.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1747 (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)).
218. Id. at 1749–50.
219. Id. at 1754.
220. Id. (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, 485). As the Supreme Court ruled:
―[T]he focus on race in the prosecution‘s file plainly demonstrates a concerted
effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury.‖ Id. at 1755.
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geography.221 ―As long as McCleskey remains good law,‖ two
scholars emphasize, ―a statistical showing of disparities in the
application of the death penalty—whether the disparities shown
are by race, gender, geography, or all three, and whether proved
on a statewide or county-level basis—will not prove an Eighth
Amendment violation.‖222 While the Eighth Amendment forbids
―cruel and unusual punishments,‖ the Fourteenth Amendment
was put in place in part to end the nineteenth-century scourge of
unequal punishments based on race. As one scholar writes:
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
prohibit unequal punishments for defendants of all races. As
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
illuminates, one of their main goals was to ―constitutionalize‖
the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to embrace the
requirement that in every state ―‗inhabitants of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude . . . shall be subject to like punishment,
pains and penalties, and no other.‘.‖223

221. See United States v. Fell, 944 F. Supp.2d 297, 349–51 (D. Vt. 2013)
(rejecting claim that then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft decided to seek
the death penalty ―on the basis of race, gender and geography, in violation of the
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments‖); see also United States v. Williams, No.
4:08-cr-00070, 2013 WL 1335599 at *7 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (refusing to hold
evidentiary hearing on defendant‘s claim that he had ―the right to not be
subjected to an arbitrary and capricious system of capital punishment directly
impacted by race, geography, and gender‖); Jackson v. United States, 638 F.
Supp.2d 514, 616 (W.D. N.C. 2009) (holding that claim asserting that he was
subjected to death penalty on the basis of race or gender of the victim was
procedurally defaulted); Brown v. United States, 583 F. Supp.2d 1330, 1349
(S.D. Ga. 2008) (discrimination-based claims found to be meritless ―as they have
been addressed elsewhere‖).
222. Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1227, 1277 (2013).
223. Stan Robin Gregory, Capital Punishment and Equal Protection:
Constitutional Problems, Race and the Death Penalty, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 257,
268–69 (1992). Interestingly, the Ku Klux Klan Act—passed by Congress in
1871, and intended (as reflected in its very title) ―to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment,‖ included a provision that prohibited conspiracies
aimed at, among other things, ―depriving any person or any class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the
laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal
protection of the laws.‖ An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes,
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As Professor Goldfarb demonstrates, context and history
matter, though the law—as it inevitably does—evolves and
sometimes even changes radically over time.224 In 2016, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hurst v. Florida225 that
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to find the aggravating
factors necessary for imposing the death penalty.226 But while
that decision struck down Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme,
juries—due to the death-qualification process—will continue to be
less diverse than the populations from which they are drawn
42nd Cong., Sess. I, ch. 22, § 2 (Apr. 20, 1871) (italics in original in the title of
the Act; italics added to the text of the Act). The Act itself sought to protect not
just individuals but ―any portion or class of the people.‖ See id. § 3:
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combinations, or conspiracies in any State shall so obstruct or hinder
the execution of the laws thereof, and of the United States, as to
deprive any portion or class of the people of such State of any of the
rights, privileges, or immunities, or protection, named in the
Constitution and secured by this act, and the constituted authorities
of such State shall either be unable to protect, or shall, from any
cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people in such rights, such
facts shall be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of
the laws to which they are entitled under the Constitution of the
United States . . . .
(emphasis added). Today, federal law still prohibits conspiracies ―for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (emphasis added). The original purpose of section
1985(3), derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was ―‗to enforce the rights
of African Americans and their supporters.‘‖ Huling v. City of Los Banos, 869 F.
Supp.2d 1139 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (citation omitted); see also United Broth.
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S.
825, 836 (1983) (―The predominate purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the
prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters.‖). In 1971, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that 1985(3) covers ―private conspiracies.‖ Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court
emphasized: ―The conspiracy . . . must aim at a deprivation of the equal
enjoyment of rights by the law to all.‖ Id. at 102.
224. A couple of cases in point: the prohibitions on the execution of juvenile
offenders and the intellectually disabled. Both of the U.S. Supreme Court
rulings putting those bars in place—ones grounded in the U.S. Constitution—
came about only after earlier precedents were overruled. See Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989).
225. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
226. Id. at 619.
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unless the Supreme Court jettisons the ―death-qualification‖
scheme altogether.227 A 2010 report by the Equal Justice
Initiative—the non-profit founded by lawyer Bryan Stevenson, a
Harvard Law School graduate and the New York Times bestselling author of Just Mercy who has helped exonerate black
death row inmates228—specifically found a pattern of ―jury
bleaching.‖ That odious practice, the striking of black jurors using
―peremptory strikes,‖ has led to all-white or predominantly white
juries even in places where the majority of the population is
black. ―All-white juries,‖ the evidence shows, ―are significantly
more likely to sentence black defendants to death, particularly in
cases involving a white victim.‖229 Because the function of juries
is ―to maintain a link between contemporary community values

227. 1 JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 163 (Joel D.
Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2016) (―The death qualification process has
been more extensively studied, and the existing research suggests that the
process itself contributes to some notable biases in shaping the capital jury as a
decision-making body.‖); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial:
Race and the Death Penalty, in MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA‘S
DEATH PENALTY REGIME 54 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds., 2002) (noting that
the ―death qualification‖ process ―often results in the removal of more
prospective jurors who are members of minority groups than those who are
white‖ and that ―[o]ften the death qualification process reduces the number of
minority jurors to few enough that those remaining can be eliminated by the
prosecutor with peremptory strikes‖).
228. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION (2014); see also One Lawyer‟s Fight for Young Blacks and ‗Just
Mercy‘, NPR (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/20/356964925/onelawyers-fight-for-young-blacks-and-just-mercy (last visited Dec. 19, 2016)
(providing an interview with Bryan Stevenson on his book) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Anthony Ray Hinton, U.S. Death Row
Inmate, Freed After 30 Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/anthony-ray-hinton-u-s-death-row-inmate-freedafter-30-years-1.3020464 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (highlighting a death row
inmate Stevenson argued was innocent and who was exonerated) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). African Americans make up a
disproportionate percentage of America‘s death row inmates. ALAN W. CLARKE &
LAURELYN WHITT, THE BITTER FRUIT OF AMERICAN JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE TO THE DEATH PENALTY 88 (2007) (―[B]lacks, who are
about 12.3 percent of the population, constitute nearly 42 percent of people on
death row, and 34 percent (350) of all modern executions have been carried out
on African Americans, thus generating numbers large enough for statistical
comparison.‖).
229. 1 RACE AND RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN MOSAIC 999 (Charles Gallagher & Cameron D. Lippard eds., 2014).
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and the penal system,‖230 and because the U.S. Supreme Court
looks to jury verdicts to evaluate the ―evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,‖231 juries
that do not reflect an entire community cannot possibly reflect the
conscience of that community.232
Provisions of the U.S. Constitution cannot be read in
isolation. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments must be read
together,233 though the Eighth Amendment was adopted decades
earlier than the latter amendment. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits ―cruel and unusual punishments‖ as well as ―excessive‖
bail and fines.234 At the time of its ratification in 1791, however,
that prohibition only applied to the federal government.235 It was
not until the post-Civil War period—and after the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, was held to apply the Bill of Rights
against the states—that states were found to be constrained by
the U.S. Constitution‘s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
and the U.S. Supreme Court‘s interpretation of it.236 As Professor
Goldfarb explains:
230. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 542 n.15 (1968).
231. This is the test that the U.S. Supreme Court has employed since 1958
to evaluate Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause claims. Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
232. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN
AMERICA 159–60 (1997) [hereinafter BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK]. By allowing
death-qualified juries, the Supreme Court is skewing the data it gets about the
public‘s views on capital cases as jurors who oppose the death penalty are not
allowed to serve. JOHN D. BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH: AMERICA‘S LOVE AFFAIR WITH
THE DEATH PENALTY 81–83 (2003). This is especially troubling because the
Supreme Court uses jury verdicts, along with legislation, to assess the ―evolving
standards of decency.‖ The Court treats jury verdicts as ―a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values‖ because jurors are ―so directly
involved.‖ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 595 (1977).
233. See BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 215 (―The Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, however interpreted, operate together to prohibit
arbitrary and discriminatory punishments and set a constitutional floor beneath
which neither federal nor state officials can traverse.‖).
234. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
235. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 28–29.
236. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The first time the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the U.S. Constitution‘s Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment was in 1962. See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). Initially, the Supreme Court did not utilize the Fourteenth
Amendment to stop discriminatory actions. See RICHARD S. CONLEY, HISTORICAL
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The Fourteenth Amendment, part of the package of
Reconstruction Amendments that followed soon after the end
of the Civil War, imposed the first explicit constitutional limits
on the power of states, because one outgrowth of the Civil War
was an awareness that tyranny could come not just from a
centralized federal power but also from decentralized state
authorities.237

The Fourteenth Amendment is so important that it has been
called a ―Second Bill of Rights‖ or a ―Second Constitution.‖238
As I have argued elsewhere, the adoption and ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily changed the Eighth
Amendment calculus. In addition to making the Eighth
Amendment applicable to the states, the Fourteenth Amendment
enshrined the concept of ―equal protection of the laws‖ into U.S.
law.239 Whereas punishments in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment
era did not need to be imposed in a non-discriminatory fashion, it
is now unconstitutional for jurors to be stricken on the grounds of
race or gender240 or for punishments to be imposed arbitrarily241
DICTIONARY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 96–97 (2016):
In the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) the Supreme Court took a narrow
view of equal protection of the law and ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to state actions. In the Civil Rights Cases
(1883), a consolidation of five cases, the high court struck down the
1875 Civil Rights Act, which set out to prohibit segregation, as
unconstitutional. In 1896 the Supreme Court affirmed ―separate but
equal‖ facilities for the races in the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. That
doctrine remained in place for 58 years until the Supreme Court
overturned it in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education
(1954).
See also id. at 97 (―It was not until the early 20th century that the Supreme
Court selectively incorporated the Bill of Rights to state actions through the
Fourteenth Amendment‘s provisions for privileges and immunities, due process,
and equal protection of the laws.‖).
237. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 12.
238. DAVID L. HUDSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION
UNDER THE LAW 3–4 (2002); see also GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR
AMERICA (2007).
239. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 306, 308.
240. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (―If the trial court
decides that the facts establish . . . purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor
does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action, our precedents
require that petitioner‘s conviction be reversed.‖); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S.
127, 143 (1994) (concluding that jurors cannot be struck on the basis of gender);
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (reaffirming that jurors cannot be
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or on the invidious bases of race242 or gender.243 When the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments are read together, punishments
struck based on race).
241. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238–39 (2005) (―The
Framers of the Constitution understood the threat of ‗judicial despotism‘ that
could arise from ‗arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions‘ without the
benefit of a jury in criminal cases.‖); LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG &
SCOTT HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 346 (3d ed. 2012) (―In 1972,
in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional due, in part, to the arbitrary and capricious manner in which it
was imposed.‖) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)); Furman, 408
U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that ―the English history of the
Clause reveals a particular concern with the establishment of a safeguard
against arbitrary punishments‖) (citing Anthony F. Granucci, „Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted‟: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839,
857–60 (1969)); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 416 (2003) (―The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a
tortfeasor.‖); Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007):
[W]e have emphasized the need to avoid an arbitrary determination
of an award‘s amount. Unless a State insists upon proper standards
that will cabin the jury‘s discretionary authority, its punitive damage
system . . . may threaten ―arbitrary punishments,‖ i.e., punishments
that reflect not an ―application of law‖ but ―a decisionmaker‘s caprice.
Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (―[A]rbitrary corporal punishment
represents an invasion of personal security . . . .‖); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 162 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting):
It is the protection from arbitrary punishments through the right to a
judicial trial with all these safeguards which over the years has
distinguished America from lands where drumhead courts and other
similar ―tribunals‖ deprive the weak and the unorthodox of life,
liberty and property without due process of law.
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―The
arbitrary imposition of punishment is the antithesis of the rule of law.‖).
242. See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis
of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37
STAN. L. REV. 27, 110–11 (1984):
A long line of cases holds that the equal protection clause prohibits
discrimination in criminal sentencing by the race of the defendant,
but no cases to date discuss its implications for discrimination by the
race of the victim. The language of the fourteenth amendment itself,
prohibiting the denial of ‗equal protection of the law,‘ speaks, if
anything, more clearly of victims than of defendants. The sponsors of
the fourteenth amendment unquestionably intended this language to
prohibit unequal punishments for defendants of different races—
indeed one of their major aims was to ‗constitutionalize‘ the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, including the requirement
that in every state ‗inhabitants of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
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cannot be ―cruel and unusual‖ and, to avoid that nomenclature,
they must not be inflicted in an unequal manner either.244 The
words that adorn the U.S. Supreme Court building—―EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW‖—must be given effect in the context of
punishment (just as they were, for example, in the context of
public education in Brown v. Board of Education) if the
Fourteenth Amendment is to be meaningful and fully
implemented.245
V. The Need for Equal Protection of the Laws: From
Discrimination and Arbitrariness to Abolition and the Protection
of Universal Rights
The basic rule of equal protection is that persons ―similarly
situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must
receive like treatment.‖246 The purpose of the Fourteenth
servitude . . . shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties,
and no other‘—but they were concerned about protecting black
victims as well.
243. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 301 (2016) (―[E]qual protection is
violated when different punishments for offenses is grounded merely on the
basis of gender.‖); see also Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1977)
(―[T]the principle of equal protection is violated when different punishment for
offenses is grounded merely on the basis of gender.‖) (citations omitted).
244. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are frequently cited and read
together. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431, 439 n.7 (N.D. Ill.
1991):
[W]hile Free purports to be advancing two grounds for recovery, one
based on the Eighth Amendment, the other based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is evident that these grounds must be read together
as one claim, since there is no basis for relief against the state based
solely on the Eighth Amendment without the requisite incorporation
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
245. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 306.
246. E.g., People v. Barrera, 14 Cal. App.4th 1555, 1565 (Cal. Ct. App., 5th
Dist. 1993); see also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 660 (1981) (―[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, introduced the constitutional requirement of
equal protection, prohibiting the States from acting arbitrarily or treating
similarly situated persons differently even with respect to privileges formerly
dispensed at the State‟s discretion.‖); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579
(2003) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ‗is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.‘‖) (quoting City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne
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Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause—it has been written—is
―to secure every person within the State‘s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents.‖247 In that regard, the Equal Protection
Clause is, logically, an ideal vehicle for enforcing universal rights,
such as the rights to be free from torture, cruelty and
discrimination.248 No one, not even prisoners, are to be subjected
to torture or gratuitous cruelty, and similarly situated offenders
should be treated alike under the law.249 The death penalty, it is
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241–
42 (1970) (―[O]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration
necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject
a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the
statutory maximum . . . .‖).
247. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, Neb., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)
(quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Tp., 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). In
the context of criminal statutes, McLaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964), emphasized:
[W]e must be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal
Protection Clause which, as reflected in congressional enactments
dating from 1870, were intended to secure ―the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property‘
and to subject all persons ‗to like punishment, pains, penalties, . . . .‖
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(citations omitted); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996):
[T]he decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ―an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.‖ A defendant may demonstrate that the administration
of a criminal law is ―directed so exclusively against a particular class
of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive‖ that the
system of prosecution amounts to ―a practical denial‖ of equal
protection of the law.
(citations omitted).
248. See JEAN THOMAS, PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE RELATIONS 86 (2015) (―The
right to be free from torture, for example, protects an interest whose importance
would be difficult to make sense of if it did not protect all persons equally.‖); see
also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 5 (―No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.‖).
249. See People v. Hamilton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1615, 1619 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (―Equal protection requires that like defendants be treated alike; a state‘s
classification of crimes and punishments must be reasonable.‖); see also Ex
parte Sizemore, 8 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928) (―Due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection of the law are
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true, has been a fixture of American life since colonial days. But
the legal landscape—both in the U.S. and abroad—is changing
rapidly, if not at lightning speed.250 While a U.N. effort seeking a
global moratorium on executions is gaining momentum,251
American anti-death penalty advocacy has been focused in the
courts and on the state level—and with some successes, with
courts declaring certain practices to be unconstitutional252 and
with six states abolishing the death penalty since 2000.253
While the U.S. Supreme Court has held that race and gender
discrimination are unconstitutional in a series of cases,254 it has
yet to effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment‘s dictates in the
secured if the law operates on all alike and do not subject the individual to the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.‖) (citations omitted).
250. E.g., John D. Bessler, Capital Punishment Law and Practices: History,
Trends, and Developments, in AMERICA‘S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE
PENAL SANCTION 19 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds.,
3d ed. 2014); John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty in Decline: From Colonial
America to the Present, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 245 (2014) (tracing the law‘s
evolution); Sheherezade C. Malik & D. Paul Holdsworth, A Survey of the History
of the Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 709 (2015):
The general global trend away from the death penalty, including
among America‘s greatest allies, makes the intrepid nature of capital
punishment within the fabric of our society more glaring. Altogether,
this makes for the possibility of very drastic changes in the near
future as to how we approach, prosecute, and punish those whose
conduct exceeds the tolerable bounds of moral depravity.
251. See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE 41–44 (5th ed. 2015); see also Sandra Babcock, The Global Debate
on the Death Penalty, 34 HUM. RTS. 17, 17 (2007) (―The international trend
toward abolition reflects a shift in the death penalty paradigm. Whereas the
death penalty was once viewed as a matter of domestic penal policy, now it is
seen as a human rights issue.‖).
252. E.g., Adam Liptak, Electrocution Is Banned in Last State to Rely on It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
9,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/09/us/09penalty.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2016) (noting that the Nebraska Supreme Court declared the electric chair to be
unconstitutional) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
253. DANIEL LACHANCE, EXECUTING FREEDOM: THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 248 n.11 (2016).
254. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling the
―separate but equal‖ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and
declaring unconstitutional state laws establishing separate public schools for
black and white students); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996) (striking down the Virginia Military Institute‘s male-only admission
policy).

THE INEQUALITY OF AMERICA‟S DEATH PENALTY

557

context of America‘s death penalty system. Thus, in McCleskey,
the Supreme Court held that the Baldus study, the statistical
study showing discrimination in Georgia‘s death penalty system,
was ―clearly insufficient‖ to support an inference that any of the
decisionmakers in that particular criminal case ―acted with
discriminatory purpose.‖255 In minimizing the role of race in
death penalty adjudications writ large and rejecting Warren
McCleskey‘s Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims, a bare majority of the Supreme Court
sidestepped the Baldus study‘s alarming findings by concluding:
―Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular
factor entered into some decisions. There is, of course, some risk
of racial prejudice influencing a jury‘s decision in a criminal case.
There are similar risks that other kinds of prejudice will
influence other criminal trials.‖ Ultimately, the Court in
McCleskey determined that the presence of that risk of racial
prejudice was not ―constitutionally unacceptable.‖256
In reaching its decision, the Court in McCleskey touted the
―substantial benefits‖ of discretion.257 Although it determined
that the Baldus study ―indicates a discrepancy that appears to
correlate with race,‖ the Court nonetheless found that ―[t]he
discrepancy indicated by the Baldus study is ‗a far cry from the
major systemic defects identified in Furman.‘‖258 The Court in
McCleskey then made this slippery slope argument:
[I]f we accepted McCleskey‘s claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we
could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the
irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to
claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to
membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.259

As Justice Powell, in extending his slippery slope argument,
continued:

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
Id. at 308–09.
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 312–13 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
Id. at 314–17.

558

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 487 (2016)
Also, there is no logical reason that such a claim need be
limited to racial or sexual bias. If arbitrary and capricious
punishment is the touchstone under the Eighth Amendment,
such a claim could—at least in theory—be based upon any
arbitrary variable, such as the defendant‘s facial
characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant
or the victim, that some statistical study indicates may be
influential in jury decisionmaking. 260

But McCleskey wasn‘t about a defendant‘s physical
attractiveness; it was about a man‘s life. And in the modern era,
the death penalty‘s legitimacy has been corroded by the
punishment‘s arbitrary, errant, and highly discriminatory
application. Indeed, many people now see capital punishment—
and increasingly and properly so—as violating basic and
fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the
rights to be free from torture and cruelty. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a widely ratified
international treaty, itself expressly provides that ―[n]o one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.‖261 The language of that treaty,
put in place in 1966, thus makes clear that the arbitrary
infliction of death sentences has been a violation of international
law for fifty years now.262 While the treaty‘s use of the
masculine—―his‖—reflects its 1960s vintage and that executions
have long been used mainly to kill men, the death penalty‘s
arbitrary and discriminatory character (which a number of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices spoke of in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia263)
has yet to be remedied.264
Not only does the arbitrary infliction of death sentences
violate long-standing international law principles, but the death
260. Id. at 317–18 (footnotes omitted).
261. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly
resolution 2200 A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), S. Exec. Doc. No. 95–2, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ―ICCPR‖], Art. 6.
262. See David Weissbrodt & Terri Rosen, Principles Against Executions, 13
HAMLINE L. REV. 579, 579 (1990) (―The right to be free from extra-legal,
arbitrary, or summary executions is recognized in a number of international
human rights instruments.‖) (citing ICCPR, art. 6).
263. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
264. In 2015, in their dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justices Stephen Breyer
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg also spoke of the death penalty‘s arbitrary and
discriminatory character. See STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY
76–80 (John D. Bessler ed. 2016).
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penalty should be found to be a torturous punishment265 and to
violate existing American constitutional law as well.266 In fact,
just as the Convention Against Torture now prohibits acts of
torture and cruelty,267 the U.S. Constitution‘s Fourteenth
Amendment has long forbidden arbitrary, discriminatory, and
excessive punishments,268 with the U.S. Supreme Court
265. In a forthcoming book, I make that argument in extensive detail. For
example, I explain how various non-lethal acts, including mock or simulated
executions, are already considered to be acts of torture, and then argue that real
executions—far more severe in nature than mock executions—should qualify as
acts of torture, too. See JOHN D. BESSLER, THE DEATH PENALTY AS TORTURE: FROM
THE DARK AGES TO ABOLITION (forthcoming 2017).
266. Not only has the Eighth Amendment long been read to bar torturous
punishments, but the U.S. Constitution has been read to forbid race- and
gender-based discrimination. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (―[I]t is
safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment.‖); City of Cleburne,
Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that laws
that classify by ―race, alienage, or national origin‖ are ―subjected to strict
scrutiny‖ because those classifications ―are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest‖ and ―are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others‖); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (―By
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly
situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.‖).
267. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Arts. 1 & 16, reprinted in WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (3d
ed. 2002).
268. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003) (―The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.‖);
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998) (noting that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits ―race and gender discrimination‖); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (―if a State wishes to authorize capital
punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a
manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
penalty‖); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(―There is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal
protection is implicit in ‗cruel and unusual‘ punishments. ‗A penalty . . . should
be considered ‗unusually‘ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or
discriminatory.‘‖) (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1970));
Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (―[T]hese discretionary
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea
of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on ‗cruel and unusual‘
punishments.‖); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 59–60 (1984) (Brennan,
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articulating the Equal Protection Clause‘s scope in a series of
cases.269 ―When those who appear similarly situated are
nevertheless treated differently,‖ the U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled, ―the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational
reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to
legislation or regulation are indeed being ‗treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions.‘‖270
For fundamental rights, such as the right to be free from
racial discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court naturally imposes
heightened protection, subjecting such laws to ―strict scrutiny.‖
Though the Supreme Court, in McCleskey, gave short shrift to the
statistics demonstrating racial bias (something Justice Harry
Blackmun pointed out in his dissent),271 it is clear that the rights
to be free from torture, cruelty, and discrimination are
fundamental ones and must be respected and protected.272 The
J., dissenting):
Almost 12 years ago, in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the
Court concluded that the death penalty, as then administered under
various state and federal statutes, constituted a cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
At that time, the Court was convinced that death sentences were
being imposed in a manner that was so arbitrary and capricious that
no individual death sentence could be constitutionally justified.
269. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 185–86 (2012); WILLIAM D. ARAIZA,
ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120 (2015).
270. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (―Thus,
when it appears that an individual is being singled out by the government, the
specter of arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection
Clause requires a ‗rational basis for the difference in treatment.‘‖) (citing Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)).
271. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 347–48 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting):
The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that
death is different. Rather than requiring ―a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination,‖ the Court
relies on the very fact that this is a case involving capital punishment
to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
(quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983)).
272. See Colleen Costello, Challenging the Practice of Transfer to Torture in
U.S. Courts: A Model Brief for Practitioners, 1 NE. U. L.J. 157, 214 (2009) (―The
right to be free from torture is a fundamental and universal right. Any
classification impinging on a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny, and
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right to equality, like the right to be free from cruelty and
torture, is itself a universal right.273 The right to equal treatment
under the law used to be, as noted earlier, more rhetoric than
reality, especially since Thomas Jefferson‘s Declaration of
Independence, which speaks of the equality of men, was
promulgated in an era of slavery and overt racial and gender
discrimination. But Jefferson‘s lofty rhetoric is, increasingly,
being actualized in the United States, with the U.S. Supreme
Court‘s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,274 for example,
guaranteeing same-sex couples the right to marry.275
It is clear—as Professor Goldfarb aptly notes—that ―capital
punishment has been reserved primarily for those convicted of
killing white people‖ and is ―disproportionately‖ imposed on men,
especially those who victimize whites such as the innocents Joe
Giarratano was convicted (perhaps falsely) of murdering. The
first recorded execution of a woman in what is now the United
States—that of Jane Champion—took place in Virginia in 1632,
and in America women represent only a small percentage, 2.5
percent, of all persons executed by state and local authorities
since 1608.276 Justice Thurgood Marshall himself once recognized
will only be upheld if ‗narrowly tailored to further compelling government
interests.‘‖) (citations omitted); Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016)
(finding that the peremptory strikes of two black prospective jurors violated the
petitioner‘s constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
and ruling that ―the focus on race in the prosecution‘s file plainly demonstrates
a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury . . . . Two
peremptory strikes on the basis of race are two more than the Constitution
allows‖); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005) (explaining that racial
discrimination in jury selection offends the U.S. Constitution‘s Equal Protection
Clause).
273. See Amy J. McMaster, Human Rights at the Crossroads: When East
Meets West, 29 VT. L. REV. 109, 119 (2004) (noting that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights establishes equality before the law as a universal
right).
274. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
275. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality:
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1018 & n.14 (2016) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) and noting that ―the U.S. Supreme Court has definitively
recognized the right of same-sex couples to marry‖); see also Loving v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4, 11–12 (1966) (striking down a statute
that prohibited marriages between whites and ―coloreds‖ on due process and
equal protection grounds).
276. O‘SHEA, supra note 41, at 4.
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the ―overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed
against men and not women.‖ After taking notice of that fact,
Justice Marshall observed: ―It is difficult to understand why
women have received such favored treatment since the purposes
allegedly served by capital punishment seemingly are applicable
to both sexes.‖277
But in her essay, Professor Goldfarb offers a compelling
explanation for why women (at least those whose conduct
conforms to traditional gender stereotypes) are less harshly
punished, an explanation rooted in society‘s history of patriarchy
and the ―chivalrous norms‖ associated with the treatment of
women.278 Her essay also explains why men who kill women,
especially black men who kill white women, have long received
the law‘s harshest treatment and are sentenced to death. Men
who kill women have not only failed to protect, they have
murderously harmed, the members of society whom earlier
generations of Anglo-Americans once called ―the weaker sex.‖279
As Goldfarb adds after studying American executions and
Giarratano‘s death sentence and laying out preexisting race,
gender and class stereotypes and ideologies: ―Inflicting harsh
punishment, including death sentences, in situations like these
supports the status quo and its multiple intersecting hierarchies,
allowing chivalrous impulses to be expressed primarily against
poor men, men of color, and other men lacking in social and
material power.‖280
The gross inequalities associated with capital punishment
have long been clear, though the U.S. Supreme Court has been
277. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 365 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
278. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 30–31. A Connecticut law—one put in place
in 1893—only permitted ―adult males‖ to attend executions. BESSLER, DEATH IN
THE DARK, supra note 232, at 63.
279. See, e.g., SUZANNE LE-MAY SHEFFIELD, WOMEN AND SCIENCE: SOCIAL
IMPACT AND INTERACTION 32–33 (2004) (―Women were understood to be the
weaker sex long before the advent of the new science in the seventeenth
century. Religion, philosophy, the legal system, and the western social hierarchy
all reflected the belief that women were physically weaker than, and
intellectually and morally inferior to, men.‖); 1 SEX AND SOCIETY 254 (2010)
(―[S]ociety has generally expected women to be feminine. Expressions such as
‗the weaker sex‘ reinforce the idea that women are in some ways lesser than, or
reliant on, their male counterparts. In that way, ideas of femininity can serve to
perpetuate inequality.‖).
280. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 29, 36–37.
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slow to recognize them. The death penalty‘s ―original sin,‖ law
professors Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker write, tracing
executions from colonial days through today, is ―the stain of racial
discrimination.‖281 As they explain of the death penalty‘s close
and inerasable association with slavery:
[T]he large increase in executions, especially of blacks, in the
South during the eighteenth century was the direct result of
the large influx of African slaves to that region. As the South‘s
slave labor economy grew, so did the demand by slave owners
for state assistance in disciplining the growing enslaved
population, to promote economic productivity and to protect
the increasingly outnumbered white population from muchfeared slave violence or revolt.282

―The extent to which capital punishment for slaves was perceived
as a public good,‖ they write, ―is demonstrated by the provision of
state compensation to the owners of executed slaves, in the same
way that property owners today are compensated when their land
is taken by the state for a public use such as a highway.‖283 In
other words, human beings as property; to be disposed of—in the
language of that era—as ―chattels.‖284
For far too long, the U.S. Supreme has ignored the realities
of discrimination associated with death sentences and executions.
When America‘s death penalty came under attack in the 1960s
and 1970s, it was the NAACP‘s Legal Defense and Educational
Fund that led the campaign.285 In cases that came before the
Supreme Court, leading civil rights organizations—from the
NAACP and the National Urban League to the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, the Mexican-American Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, and the National Council of
Negro Women—submitted or joined amici briefs. ―The total
281.
282.
283.
284.

STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 5, at 3.
Id. at 19.
Id.
See, e.g., THE LAWS OF SLAVERY IN TEXAS: HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS AND
ESSAYS 1 (Randolph B. Campbell ed., 2010) (―The institution of African slavery
as practiced in the antebellum United States depended on the ownership of
humans as chattels, pieces of movable personal property.‖); MILTON MEITZER,
SLAVERY: A WORLD HISTORY 3 (1971) (―Often the word ‗chattel‘ is used in
connection with slavery. Chattel means property or capital. It means livestock,
too, such as cattle—or a slave.‖).
285. STEIKER & STEIKER, , supra note 5, at 78–79.
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history of the administration of capital punishment in America,
both through formal authority, and informally,‖ the NACCP
argued in one submission, ―is persuasive evidence, that racial
discrimination was, and still is, an impermissible factor in the
disproportionate imposition of the death penalty upon non-white
American citizens.‖286 Yet, as the Steikers so cogently explain:
Despite ample ammunition in the amicus briefs, none of the
justices seemed willing to offer a detailed history of the role of
race in shaping capital statutes and practices for over 200
years; Justices Douglas and Marshall, the only two justices
who addressed race at all, both stopped short of placing the
practice in its historical, slavery-rooted context.287

This was, clearly, a missed opportunity, though the Supreme
Court undoubtedly made a conscious decision at the time to play
down the issue of racial discrimination in the death penalty‘s
administration. In their thoughtful and compelling book,
Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker offer this analysis: ―The Court‘s
deafening silence on the subject of race in its foundational capital
punishment cases is striking but, on reflection, perhaps not
altogether surprising. Ample reasons of various kinds—strategic,
institutional, ideological, and psychological—help explain what
otherwise might appear to be a baffling obtuseness.‖288 ―In light
of the Court‘s ongoing role in the school desegregation battle,‖
they observe, ―it is no wonder that Chief Justice Warren, the
architect of the Court‘s unanimous opinion in Brown, hesitated to
add capital punishment to the simmering pot of racial issues.‖289
―The Warren Court‘s desegregation rulings and its criminal
procedure revolution,‖ they add, ―already seemed to target
Southern institutions, and these decisions engendered
substantial backlash in that region.‖290 ―A race-based abolition,‖
they conclude, ―would have amounted to an acknowledgment that
the effects of institutionalized racism could not be erased by
constitutional intervention—the very last message that the
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 47, at 1–3.
STEIKER & STEIKER, , supra note 5, at 90.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
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Supreme Court wanted to send in the era of constitutionally
mandated school desegregation and criminal procedure
reform.‖291
But in this second decade of the twenty-first century, the
U.S. Supreme Court now finds itself at a crossroads as regards
the punishment of death. It can let it continue, or it can say no
more—no more will the United States of America engage in statesanctioned killing. ―The most profound consequence of the Court‘s
failure to address the issue of race in its capital jurisprudence,‖
the Steikers aptly note, ―is that the unjust influence of race in the
capital punishment process continues unchecked.‖292 As they
explain in their book:
More broadly, the Court‘s failure to address forthrightly the
death penalty‘s racialized history and current practice has
disserved the Court in its role as chronicler of history and
social and political practices. Had the Court framed its
constitutional regulation of capital punishment against the
backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated
trials, and disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would
have done a much better job of explaining why the American
death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the
American judiciary. This would have been true even if the
Court ultimately had framed its doctrines in nonracial
terms.293

VI. Conclusion
The death penalty‘s racial and gender bias is clear.294
Congressman John Conyers once took note of the ―gender
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 105.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
See Amanda Oliver, The Death Penalty Has a Gender Bias,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Oct.
1,
2015,
12:40
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amanda-oliver/are-women-getting-awaywi_b_8227690.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not
Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. &
JUST. 64, 84 (2012):
Studies of gender and the death penalty have, for the most part,
focused on the gender of the defendant and have consistently found
that women are sentenced to death and executed at significantly
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discrimination‖ associated with capital sentencing,295 and
Professor Elizabeth Rapaport—a law professor at the University
of New Mexico School of Law—has written of the ―chivalrous
disinclination to sentence women to die.‖ While articulating her
―chivalry‖ theory, she simultaneously posits an ―evil woman‖
hypothesis to explain ―the gender stereotyping that has
historically dehumanized despised female murderers‖ and
resulted in their execution when they violate ―sex role
expectations‖ (e.g., by killing their children or husbands).296 The
Washington, D.C.-based Death Penalty Information Center,
documenting the racial prejudice in the death penalty‘s
administration, also cites study after study showing that killers
of whites are much more likely to be sentenced to death than
killers of blacks. In the modern era, the statistics for those
lower rates than men. A study of the death penalty applied to women
from 1973–2005 found that at every stage of the process female
defendants appear to be diverted away from the death penalty at a
greater rate than men. While 10% of people arrested for murder are
women, only 2% of death sentences imposed at trial are imposed upon
women, and women account for only 1.1% of persons actually
executed. Men arrested for murder are six times more likely to be
sentenced to death than are women arrested for murder.
295. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts about the Department of Justice‟s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 378
n.170 (1999).
296. Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women
on the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 581, 600 (2000); Elizabeth
Rapaport, Some Questions About Gender and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 501, 503–504, 513 (1990); see also DAVID W. NEUBAUER & HENRY
F. FRADELLA, AMERICA‘S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 441 (12th ed.
2015):
The evil woman hypothesis focuses on traditional sex-role
expectations. This hypothesis emphasizes that women lose the
advantages normally provided by chivalry and paternalism when
they are convicted of ―manly‖ crimes such as robbery or assault. This
evil woman view argues that women might actually be treated more
harshly than men when they deviate from stereotypical sex-role
expectations.
Andrea L. Lewis & Sara L. Sommervold, Death, But Is It Murder? The Role of
Stereotypes and Cultural Perceptions in the Wrongful Convictions of Women, 78
ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2015) (―Historically, Western society has considered a
woman‘s role to be that of wife and mother.‖); Joan W. Howarth, Executing
White Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye Tucker, 81 ORE. L. REV. 183, 185
(2002) (―Gender helps to explain why we execute, and it helps to determine who
we execute.‖).
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executed for interracial homicides are particularly telling. While
20 people have been executed for interracial homicides involving
a white defendant and a black victim, an exponentially higher
number of people—282—have been executed where the defendant
was black and the victim was white.297
Such discrimination calls for a remedy, and in the case of the
death penalty, the only remedy that will suffice is the death
penalty‘s abolition. In ―Matters of Strata,‖ Professor Goldfarb
emphasizes that ―when race, gender, and class play an
explanatory role in decisions about who receives a death
sentence, under the Supreme Court‘s death penalty jurisprudence
those decisions constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.‖298 And her perceptive essay,
in tracing Joseph Giarratano‘s case and the ideologies and long
history of discrimination undergirding the death penalty that
―undermine‖ its legitimacy,299 makes clear that, as a society, we
need ―to find other approaches.‖300 Just as the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer,301 held in the 1940s that judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants attempting to bar minorities
from ownership or occupancy of real property violated due process
and equal protection principles, a wholly arbitrary and
discriminatory death penalty regime—one still in place in the
twenty-first century—should not be tolerated.302 A government
297. Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 2
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.
298. Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 4.
299. Id. at 5.
300. Id. at 49.
301. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
302. See THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
283 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999) (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer and the ―state
action‖ doctrine). In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a private litigant
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race
since race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the challenged
jurors. As the Supreme Court ruled in that civil case that post-dates its 1987
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp: ―Race discrimination within the courtroom
raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there.
Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of
democratic government from becoming a reality.‖ Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991); see also id. at 619 (―Racial
discrimination, though invidious in all contexts, violates the Constitution only
when it may be attributed to state action.‖).
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should not involve itself with such a cruel and torturous
punishment—one that, throughout American history, has been
imbibed with racial discrimination, gender inequities, malice and
hatred, and lottery-like arbitrariness.303
In their 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross,304 Justice Stephen
Breyer—joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg—called for a ―full
briefing‖ on whether capital punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment and concluded that it is ―highly likely‖ that it
does.305 In a subsequent speech in Chicago, Illinois, Justice
Ginsburg—in talking about their dissenting opinion in Glossip—
specifically highlighted the death penalty‘s arbitrariness, telling
her audience: ―Factors that should not affect imposition of the
death penalty, studies documented, often do, prime among those
factors, race and geography.‖306 ―Ultimately,‖ she said, ―the
considerations Justice Breyer discussed at length may bring us
back to the years 1972–76, when no executions took place in the
United States.‖307 Already, the American death penalty is actively
303. The administration of America‘s death penalty—at bottom—resembles
the kind of arbitrariness and inhuman cruelty described in a famous short story
published in The New Yorker after World War II. See Shirley Jackson, The
Lottery, NEW YORKER, June 26, 1948, at 25 (describing a fictional small town in
America in which an annual ritual, known as ―the lottery,‖ takes place—a
lottery in which, every year, a name is drawn out of a black box and the
unfortunate person selected is then stoned to death). Its author, Shirley
Jackson, later gave this statement to the San Francisco Chronicle when pressed
to explain the story‘s meaning: ―Explaining just what I had hoped the story to
say is very difficult. I suppose, I hoped, by setting a particularly brutal ancient
rite in the present and in my own village to shock the story‘s readers with a
graphic dramatization of the pointless violence and general inhumanity in their
own lives.‖ SHIRLEY JACKSON 33–34 (Harold Bloom ed., 2001). While people
living under Sharia law are still stoned to death for adultery and prostitution,
the modern American death penalty is, in fact, nothing more than a primitive
rite—something right out of the Dark Ages. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM. OF THE
NAT‘L COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN, WOMEN, ISLAM & EQUALITY 22–24 (1995)
(noting how women are lashed, stoned to death, or thrown off buildings for
adultery or other acts under religious-based penal codes in places such as Iran);
MORRIS BERMAN, DARK AGES AMERICA: THE FINAL PHASE OF EMPIRE 8 (2006)
(noting that ―the American legal system, at one time the world standard, is now
regarded by many other nations as outmoded and provincial, or even barbaric,
given our use of the death penalty‖).
304. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
305. STEPHEN BREYER, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 96 (John D. Bessler ed.
2016).
306. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, MY OWN WORDS 36 (2016).
307. Id. at 35–36. The first execution after the U.S. Supreme Court‘s
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used in only a small fraction of U.S. counties.308 As Emily Bazelon
wrote for the New York Times Magazine in 2016: ―A new
geography of capital punishment is taking shape, with just 2
percent of the nation‘s counties now accounting for a majority of
the people sitting on death row.‖309
In State v. Santiago,310 the Connecticut Supreme Court
declared that state‘s death penalty unconstitutional. In doing so,
it held that ―the eighth amendment is offended not only by the
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, but also by
the greater evils of racial discrimination and other forms of
pernicious bias in the selection of who will be executed.‖311 As
that court emphasized: ―Unfortunately, numerous studies have
found that ‗[e]rrors can and have been made repeatedly in the
trial of death penalty cases because of poor representation, racial
prejudice, prosecutorial misconduct, or simply the presentation of
erroneous evidence.‘‖312 ―A study of all death sentences in the
United States in the two decades following Furman,‖ it pointed
out, ―found ‗extremely high error rates‘ . . . ; with at least two
thirds of capital sentences eventually overturned on appeal.‖313
―Statistical analyses studies,‖ it added, ―have demonstrated to a
near certainty that innocent Americans have been and will
continue to be executed in the post-Furman era.‖314 As the court
concluded after compiling all of the evidence: ―To the extent that
the ultimate punishment is imposed on an offender on the basis
decision in Furman v. Georgia took place in 1977 when Gary Gilmore was
executed by firing squad in Utah. See MICHAEL KRONENWETTER, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 129 (2d ed. 2001); MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT
IN THE HEART 368 (1994).
308. See Matt Ford, The Death Penalty Becomes Rare, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-death-penaltybecomes-unusual/390867/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (noting that in 2012 only
59 of the 3,144 counties in America actually sentenced people to be executed) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. Emily Bazelon, Where the Death Penalty Still Lives, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/magazine/where-the-deathpenalty-still-lives.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
310. 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015).
311. Id. at 19.
312. Id. at 65.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
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of impermissible considerations such as his, or his victim‘s, race,
ethnicity, or socio-economic status, rather than the severity of his
crime, his execution does not restore but, rather, tarnishes the
moral order.‖315
Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon follow suit,
looking to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Connecticut
and other judicial systems around the world that have already
outlawed the punishment of death. Way back in 1995, South
Africa‘s Constitutional Court—in the wake of apartheid‘s
demise—declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional as a
―cruel, inhuman or degrading‖ punishment.316 Ironically, the
President of the Court, Arthur Chaskalson, in writing for South
315. Id. at 66. Death sentences are tied up with issues of poverty, race and
poor legal representation as cases like those of Earl Washington and Ronald
Jones make clear. Washington—a black man with an IQ of 69—falsely confessed
to a rape and murder he did not commit. At his trial, his lawyer did little to
convince the jury of Washington‘s innocence, and it took years before he was
exonerated. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 10, 29–30, 145–48, 154 (2011); PETER NEUFELD &
BARRY SCHECK, THE INNOCENTS 18 (2003). Jones—another black man who falsely
confessed to a rape and murder in Chicago, Illinois—spent eight years on death
row before being exonerated by DNA evidence. After his exoneration, Jones
observed: ―You‘re not gonna see no rich people on death row, very few of them
even go to jail. I have not—to date—seen a rich man go to death row.‖ As Jones
emphasized: ―It‘s two types of justice: there‘s a poor man‘s justice and a rich
man‘s justice.‖ Id. at 48. The grotesque lynchings that preceded modern-day
executions were themselves frequently driven by racial animus as the protest
song, ―Strange Fruit,‖ popularized by Billie Holiday, so vividly illustrates. DAVID
MARGOLICK, STRANGE FRUIT: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A SONG 3–10 (2001). The song‘s
opening lyrics: Southern trees bear a strange fruit / Blood on the leaves and blood
at the root / Black bodies swingin‟ in the Southern breeze / Strange fruit hangin‟
from the poplar trees. BILLIE HOLIDAY, LADY SINGS THE BLUES (PolyGram
Records 1995), Vol. 4, Track 12. An anti–lynching song written by Bronx high
school English teacher Abel Meeropol and his wife Ann, Billie Holiday first
performed the song in Harlem in 1939 at Café Society, at the time New York
City‘s only integrated nightclub. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RACE RIOTS 782
(Walter Rucker & James Nathaniel Upton, eds. 2007); 1 RACE AND RACISM IN
THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN MOSAIC 541 (Charles A.
Gallagher & Cameron D. Lippard, eds. 2014). Abel and Ann Meeropol also
gained notoriety after Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were executed for espionage
in 1953. Abel and Ann Meeropol adopted the ten-year-old and six-year-old sons
of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg following their deaths in New York‘s electric
chair. ROBERT NIEMI, HISTORY IN THE MEDIA: FILM AND TELEVISION 251 (2006); L.
KAY GILLESPIE, EXECUTED WOMEN OF THE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES 69 (2009).
316. State v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 8,
26; (S. Afr.); HANS GÖRAN FRANCK, THE BARBARIC PUNISHMENT: ABOLISHING THE
DEATH PENALTY 75–78 (William Schabas ed. 2003).
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Africa‘s highest court, looked to the reasoning of an American
case—Furman v. Georgia—to support the propositions that ―[a]t
every stage of the process there is an element of chance‖ and that
―poverty, race and chance play roles in the outcome of capital
cases and in the final decision as to who should live and who
should die.‖317 If the present-day U.S. Supreme Court would only
return to its own roots—Furman‘s denunciation of the death
penalty as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments318—the American legal system could finally uproot
a barbaric, discriminatory practice rooted in the Dark Ages and
the institution of slavery.

317. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 43, 48, 51–52, 77,
97.
318. Before Justices Breyer and Ginsburg issued their dissent in Glossip v.
Gross, Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan had, during their
tenures, called upon America‘s judicial system to outlaw the punishment of
death. See, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS
DISSENTS OF JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL (1996) (detailing their dissents
against capital punishment in more than 2,500 cases); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J. concurring) (―I continued to believe that the
death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖); id. at 442:
I remain hopeful that even if the Court is unwilling to accept the view
that the death penalty is so barbaric that it is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, it may eventually conclude that the effort
to eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate sanction is
so plainly doomed to failure that it—and the death penalty—must be
abandoned altogether.

